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Abstract
Current techniques used by forensic investigators during incident response and search and
seizure operations generally involve pulling the power on suspect machines and performing
traditional dead box post-mortem analysis on the persistent storage medium. These cyber-
forensic techniques may cause significant disruption to the evidence gathering process by
breaking active network connections and unmounting encrypted disks. In contrast, live
forensic tools can collect evidence from a running system while preserving system state.
In addition to collecting the standard set of evidence, these tools can collect evidence from
live web browser sessions, VPN connections, IM and e-mail.
Although newer live forensic analysis tools can preserve active state, they may taint
evidence by leaving footprints in memory. Current uses of live forensics in corporate in-
cident response efforts are limited because the tools used to analyze the system inherently
taint the state of disks and memory. As a result, the courts have been reluctant to accept
evidence collected from volatile memory and law enforcement has been reluctant to use
these techniques broadly.
To help address these concerns we present Forenscope, a framework that allows an in-
vestigator to examine the state of an active system without inducing the effects of taint or
forensic blurriness caused by analyzing a running system. Forenscope allows an investiga-
tor to gain access to a machine through a forced reboot. The key insight that enables this
technique is that the contents of memory on many machines are preserved across a warm
reboot. Upon reboot, Forenscope patches the OS state in residual memory to kill screen
savers, neutralize anti-forensics software and bypass other authentication mechanisms. We
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show how Forenscope can fit into accepted workflows to improve the evidence gathering
process.
Forenscope fully preserves the state of the running system and allows running pro-
cesses, open files, encrypted filesystems and open network sockets to persist during the
analysis process. Forenscope has been tested on live systems to show that it does not op-
erationally disrupt critical processes and that it can perform an analysis in less than 15
seconds while using only 125 KB of conventional memory. We show that Forenscope can
detect stealth rootkits, neutralize threats and expedite the investigation process by finding
evidence in memory.
The techniques developed in Forenscope belong to a broader class of volatile forensic
techniques that are becoming increasingly important in the face of new privacy measures
and changes in the way storage systems are built. We are starting to see the limitations
of traditional forensic approaches emerge as users shift to using more networked services,
privacy guard software and non-magnetic storage technologies such as NAND and phase
change memory that do not exhibit the same data residue properties as traditional disks.
These trends help motivate the development of more sophisticated forensic techniques.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Thesis Statement:
Forenscope provides high-fidelity live forensics that extract residual evidence interactively
without inducing taint.
Current forensic tools are limited by their inability to preserve the hardware and soft-
ware state of a system during investigation. Post-mortem analysis tools require the investi-
gator to shut down the machine to inspect the contents of the disk and identify artifacts of
interest. This process breaks network connections and unmounts encrypted disks causing
significant loss of evidence and possible disruption of critical systems. In contrast, live
forensic tools can allow an investigator to inspect the state of a running machine without
disruption. However existing tools can overwrite evidence present in memory or alter the
contents of the disk causing forensic taint. Furthermore, taking a snapshot of the system
can result in a phenomenon known as forensic blurriness[1] where an inconsistent snapshot
is captured because the system is running while it is being observed. These shortcomings
adversely affect the fidelity and quantity of evidence acquired and can cast doubt on the
validity of the analysis, making the courts more reluctant to accept such evidence [2].
Experts at the SANS institute and the DOJ are starting to recognize the importance of
volatile memory as a source of evidence to help combat cybercrime [3, 4]. In response,
the SANS institute recently published a report on volatile memory analysis [5]. To help
address the limitations of existing volatile memory analysis tools we present Forenscope,
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a framework for live forensics, that can capture, analyze and explore the state of a com-
puter without disrupting the system or tainting important evidence. Chapter 2 shows how
Forenscope can fit into accepted workflows to enhance the evidence gathering process.
Many elements of a computer’s state are kept in volatile memory. Information such
as running processes, open network connections, browser sessions and mounted encrypted
disks are only available while a computer is left running and logged in. When a forensic
analyst encounters a suspect system that is still running, he or she is often faced with the
choice of whether or not to “pull-the-plug.” By cutting power to the machine, the forensic
analyst implicitly makes the choice to perform dead box analysis, which studies the con-
tents of a computer’s persistent storage devices such as hard drives. On the other hand, by
making a conscious choice to leave the machine running, the analyst has opened the door to
live forensics. This thesis is focused on the development of forensics techniques to analyze
residual evidence in a computer’s volatile memory.
While live forensics can potentially offer vast amounts of information about the ephemeral
state of the system, such techniques are still relatively nascent and often cannot produce
repeatable results due to the volatile nature of the problem and presence of unpredictable
external inputs. Unlike dead box analysis, live forensics is faced with the risk of causing
distortive alterations to the computer’s state. Existing tools to analyze a live system are
generally concerned with obtaining a snapshot of memory and system state rather than al-
lowing the investigator to freely explore the state of a system while it is running. Such
exploration can allow an analyst to collect additional evidence across open network con-
nections, VPN sessions and browser sessions before the system is taken down. While live
tools can run the risk of alteration, they are often times the only avenue by which an in-
vestigator can recover certain kinds of key information mentioned earlier. Without such
information, it would be significantly harder to gather convincing evidence to lead to a
successful conviction.
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Forensic investigators often have two conflicting requirements alluded to in our discus-
sion of dead box vs. live forensics. They need to be able to explore the state of a system
interactively to look for ephemeral evidence, but they also need some level of assurance
that the system under investigation isn’t exposed to an excessive amount of distortive alter-
ations. Forenscope’s design provides the ability for investigators to make fewer compro-
mises in the investigation process. To illustrate how the tool can help, we describe a typical
scenario in Chapter 2 using Forenscope and compare it against what an investigator may
do using conventional tools.
Forenscope leverages DRAM memory remanence to preserve the state of the running
operating system across a ”state-preserving reboot” (Chapter 5), which recovers the exist-
ing OS without going through the full boot-up process. This process enables Forenscope to
gain complete control over the system and perform taint-free forensic analysis using well-
grounded introspection techniques from the virtual machine and simulation community[6].
Finally, Forenscope resumes the existing OS, preserving active network connections and
disk encryption sessions while causing minimal service interruption in the process. Foren-
scope captures the contents of system memory to a removable USB device and activates a
software write blocker to inhibit modifications to the disk. To maintain fidelity, it operates
exclusively in 125 KB of unused legacy conventional memory and does not taint the con-
tents of extended memory. Since Forenscope preserves the state of a running machine, it is
suitable for use in certain production and critical infrastructure environments. To show its
versatility, we have thoroughly tested and evaluated Forenscope on an SEL-1102, a power
substation industrial computer, and an IBM desktop workstation. The machines were able
to perform their duties under a variety of test conditions with minimal interruption and
running Forenscope did not cause any network applications to time out or fail. To enable
customized workflows, Forenscope allows forensic analysts to develop domain-specific
analysis modules. We have implemented several modules that can check for the presence
of malware, detect open network sockets and locate evidence in memory such as rootkit
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modifications to help the investigator identify suspicious activity.
The contributions of this work include:
1. An extensible software framework for high-fidelity live forensics that conforms to the
best practices of a legal framework of evidence.
2. Efficient techniques to gather, snapshot and explore a system without bringing it down.
3. An analysis of the characteristics of evidence preserved in volatile memory.
4. Implementation and evaluation on several machines including a standard industrial ma-
chine and against several anti forensics rootkits.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: first, we introduce cyber-forensics in
Chapter 2 and characterize evidence in residual memory in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes
Forenscope, Chapter 5 describes the design, Chapter 6 discusses forensic modules and we
evaluate the effectiveness of Forenscope in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 discusses issues involved
in forensics, Chapter 9 surveys related work and we conclude in Chapter 10.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 The Forensic Process
2.1.1 Definitions of Forensics
Forensics is a broad field that applies the use of scientific methods and techniques to the
investigation of crime. Although the term “digital forensics” can have many definitions
depending on the context, we adopt a commonly accepted definition of digital forensics as:
Tools and techniques to recover, preserve, and examine digital evidence on or transmitted
by digital devices
Other definitions currently in use include:
1. “Information stored or transmitted in binary form that may be relied upon in court” [7]
2. “Information of probative value that is stored or transmitted in binary form” [8]
3. “Information and data of investigative value that is stored on or transmitted by a com-
puter” [9]
4. “Any data stored or transmitted using a computer that support or refute a theory of how
an offense occurred or that address critical elements of the offense such as intent or
alibi” [10]
2.1.2 Locard’s exchange principle
Locard’s exchange principle states that “with contact between two items, there will be an
exchange.” This principle is more commonly known as the idiom “every contact leaves a
5
trace”[11]. It is one of the foundational principles behind forensics that suggests that when
a crime is committed, evidence will be left behind no matter how much the culprit tries
to clean up his tracks. This link is fairly evident in the physical world. For instance, a
bullet fired from a gun will leave behind an imprint of the gun’s barrel on the surface of the
bullet as it leaves the barrel. This imprint can be used to trace back to the gun that fired the
bullet. Likewise, in the digital world, log files leave records of a suspect’s actions. Even if
a suspect successfully erases or alters a system’s logs, other forms of evidence such as file
modification time or the use of multiple log files may still suggest a suspect’s culpability. In
the context of this thesis, the contents of volatile memory [12] have been used as evidence
where traditional forms of evidence such as log files did not provide sufficient information.
Locard’s principle of exchange works both ways: it can incriminate a suspect with
evidence left behind, but if an investigator is not careful in collecting the evidence, he
may cause an undesired exchange and accidentally contaminate the original crime scene’s
evidence by inducing his own changes. Therefore, it is critical for investigators to follow
procedures that preserve evidence and minimize taint.
2.1.3 Digital Forensic Process
The U.S. National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has published a process model in the Elec-
tronic Crime Scene Investigation Guide [13]. Their workflow is meant to help guide a first
responder and it consists of the following steps:
1. Preparation: Prepare the equipment and tools to perform the tasks required during an
investigation.
2. Collection: Search for, document, and collect or make copies of the physical objects that
contain electronic evidence.
3. Examination: Make the electronic evidence visible and document contents of the system.
Data reduction is performed to identify the evidence.
6
4. Analysis: Analyze the evidence from the Examination phase to determine the signifi-
cance and probative value.
5. Reporting: Create examination notes after each case.
In this work, we are primarily concerned with the collection phase. The fidelity of
evidence throughout the workflow must be preserved to show that the alleged evidence is in
fact related to the alleged crime. This process is called the Chain of custody. To illustrate
this concept, suppose that an investigator collects a blood sample at a crime scene. This
blood sample is then sent to a lab for analysis. Upon completion of testing, the sample
is sent to a warehouse for archival purposes. Then, suppose the defendant challenges the
authenticity of the evidence and requests proof of validity. The investigator must show that
the blood sample analyzed was indeed the sample found at the crime scene. The evidence
handling process requires the investigator to document each action carefully to show that
the sample collected at the crime scene is authentic and that each transfer of the sample to
another party did not result in contamination or misidentification. Chain of evidence in the
physical sense often involves specific procedures and documentation. In the cyber sense, it
often involves taking a cryptographic hash of the evidence collected. If the hash values do
not match, the evidence cannot be admissible in a court.
Many states use the Daubert guidelines [14] as a measure to prevent the use of “junk
science” in court. These guidelines specify that a forensic procedure must adhere to the
following guidelines to be admissible in court:
1. Published - The procedure in question must be published
2. Community acceptance - The community must accept the use of this procedure
3. Tested - The procedure must be tested to ensure that it produces the desired results
4. Error rate - The error rate of the procedure must be known
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With regard to Forenscope, our methodology is published in the academic literature and
we believe that it will gain the community’s acceptance in time. We attempt to do our best
to ensure that our procedure is tested and we measure our error rate in Chapter 7.
2.1.4 Is forensics a science?
Traditionally, forensic science has been concerned with forensics in the physical world. In
this context, investigators have the benefit of working with known and predictable concepts,
which allow them to predict the effects of physical laws such as that of gravity without
having to measure or rediscover it each time at the crime scene. In the digital world,
such laws rarely exist, and if they do, they are often highly dependent on the operating
environment.
Loosely speaking, the term “forensic science” has been frequently used [15], but it has
not been clear whether these techniques are actual applications of scientific or of engineer-
ing principles. Much of the known academic work in “digital forensics” thus far has been
based upon ad hoc techniques to recover data from storage devices and volatile memory.
To the best of our knowledge, the most significant attempt to formalize these processes
is Brian Carrier’s doctoral dissertation [16]. We use Carrier’s formalism throughout this
dissertation to help formally reason about our own work. Carrier has successfully used this
formal description to categorize and reason about many well-known forensic techniques.
2.2 Formal Definition for Forensics
Carrier[16] uses a finite state machine (FSM) to model a digital crime scene that may
consist of a computer, storage devices and the attached network. As this system operates,
it reacts to a stream of incoming events that advance the state of the machine. In his model,
the state of the machine is defined as the state of all storage devices. Peripheral devices
such as hard drives are simply storage devices and networks are considered a special case
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where the network cable is a temporary storage device and the computers at the other end
are also finite state machines. By representing the lowest levels of the machine as a state
machine, Carrier is able to compose these abstractions into layers to define data structures,
the execution of software and the forensic process itself. We use his formalism in this
dissertation to represent our concepts more precisely.
We briefly summarize Carrier’s FSM as follows:
The state machine is defined by the quintuple M = (Q,Σ, δ, s0, F ) where Q is a finite
set of machine states and Σ is a finite alphabet of event symbols. The transition function
δ : Q × Σ → Q is the event mapping between states in Q for each event symbol in Σ.
The machine state changes only as a result of a new input symbol. The starting state of the
machine is s0 ∈ Q and the final states are F ⊆ Q [17].
To complement the state machine model, Carrier also defines a model for observations.
Since the investigator cannot physically observe the state of the machine, he must rely on
the operating system and software processes to query the state of the machine. If any part
of this system is not trustworthy, for instance, if it has been compromised by malware,
then the output cannot be trustworthy. Carrier’s model uses an information flow graph
G = (V,E) where V is a set of vertices and E is a set of directed edges. Each component
is a vertex and an edge exists from vertex a to vertex b if information flows from a to b.
Figure 2.1 depicts this relationship. In this figure, information flows from the bottom-most
layers up to the investigator. Events observed by the investigator must have a valid chain of
trust to be trustworthy. For instance, if the flow from the disk to the editor was tapped by a
rootkit, an attacker may be able to conceal critical files or processes from an investigator.
2.2.1 Deadbox vs. Live Forensics
Traditionally, dead box forensics referred to physically shutting a machine down and per-
forming a post-mortem analysis on the persistent storage medium. The “dead” designation
refers to the fact that the analysis is performed while the target OS is not being executed
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Figure 2.1: Information flow for components
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or used to analyze the data. Instead, a separate boot medium such as a trusted boot CD is
used.
In contrast, live forensics techniques do rely on the target operating system to provide
services to perform the analysis. Although it’s convenient to distinguish these techniques
based on whether the target machine is powered on or off, we think that an alternate per-
spective based on trustworthiness is helpful for this dissertation. In this perspective, dead
box forensics inherently distrusts the OS and software stack, so the forensic tool provides
its own analysis environment. Live forensics in this case then relies on existing software
facilities to perform the analysis. Recall the trusted information flow paths in Figure 2.1.
Dead box forensics formally does not depend on any nodes in the graph that may belong
to the incumbent OS. Live forensics must share one or more nodes in the information flow
graph to acquire information.
The target of this dissertation is to develop a hybrid tool, Forenscope, which has the
trustworthiness benefits of dead box analysis and the uptime benefits of live analysis.
Forenscope achieves this desired state by providing a recoverable “golden state” that ex-
hibits the trustworthiness properties of dead box analysis, and this state can be recovered
to the original running system afterward to provide the benefits of live analysis. Chapter 4
describes this state in more detail.
2.3 Existing Digital Forensic Tools
Digital Forensic investigators often have two conflicting requirements alluded to in our dis-
cussion of dead box vs. live forensics. They need to be able to explore the state of a system
interactively to look for ephemeral evidence, but they also need some level of assurance
that the system under investigation isn’t exposed to an excessive amount of distortive al-
terations. Forenscope’s design provides investigators with several features that allow an
investigator to make fewer compromises in the investigation process.
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While the steps described in Section 2.1.3 are executed for most cases, there are spe-
cial requirements for each case. For instance, in criminal investigation, the integrity and
fidelity of the data is paramount. As evidence presented in court must be as accurate as
possible, special steps must be taken to ensure fidelity. For incident response, the goal is to
detect and react to security breaches while minimizing the intrusiveness of the process. In
some critical systems it is impractical to interrupt the system to perform forensic analysis
of a potential breach and service level agreements (SLAs) may impose financial penalties
for downtime. To preserve the fidelity of the original evidence, many forensic workflows
capture a pristine image of the evidence and draw conclusions based on analysis of the
copy. Conventional post-mortem forensic workflows perform this task by physically shut-
ting down a computer and copying the contents of the hard drive for subsequent analysis.
On the other hand, live forensics are often desired during evidence collection because they
provide access to networked resources such as active SSH and VPN sessions, remote desk-
top connections, IM clients and file transfers. However even state-of-the-art solutions often
cannot image a system with high fidelity and frequently introduce taint in the process. In
summary, existing tools require the investigator to make a trade-off between an increase in
fidelity through post mortem analysis and the potential to collect important volatile infor-
mation using live forensic tools at the cost of tainting evidence.
One of the key issues in collecting volatile information is that various forms of data
such as CPU registers, memory, disk and network connections have different lifetimes. To
maximize evidence preservation, RFC 3227 [18] outlines the order of volatility of these
resources and dictates the order in which evidence should be collected for investigation.
Commercially available products currently used by forensic experts for incident response
such as Encase [19], Microsoft COFEE [20], Helix [21], FTK Imager [22], Volatility [23]
and Memoryze [24] etc., do not capture all forms of data. A comparison of these products
is presented in Table 2.1. Scalpel[25] and Sleuth kit are solely designed for disk analysis
while other tools such as Encase, Helix and FTK include some level of memory capture
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Forenscope with existing forensic tools
Evidence Registers Memory Network Processes Disk Encryption
RFC 3227 Reqs Nanosecs Seconds Minutes Minutes Hours Hours
Encase × X × × X ×
Helix × X X X X ×
FTK × X X X X X
Scalpel × × × × X ×
Memoryze × X X X × ×
Volatility × X X X × ×
MS COFEE × X X X × ×
Volatility × X X X × ×
Sleuth kit × × × × X ×
Forenscope X X X X X X
and analysis capability. Memoryze and Volatility are the only tools listed in the table that
attempt to perform volatile memory analysis. Some tools such as Helix, FTK and Memo-
ryze can list the state of open network sockets, but the underlying network connections may
not be preserved during the analysis process. All live forensic tools listed in this table rely
on the integrity of the running kernel. Compromised systems may provide inaccurate in-
formation. Evidence preservation and minimizing forensic intrusiveness are hard problems
that haven’t been adequately addressed in the literature.
In contrast, Forenscope was built to comply with the collection stage where it maxi-
mizes the preservation of evidence and avoids disruption of ongoing activities to allow the
capture of high fidelity evidence. As a result, we believe that Forenscope may be more
broadly applicable to various scenarios that require live forensics such as incident response
and criminal investigation. For incident response, we recognize that the integrity of the
machine may be violated by malware and our solutions have been designed to address
this scenario. For criminal investigation, we presume that the machine may have various
security mechanisms implemented such as encrypted disks coupled with authentication
mechanisms such as logon screens and screensaver locks.
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Quantity Description
Snapshot St Instantaneous contents of memory at time t
Natural drift δv The change in the state of system over time t which can also
be referred to as the blurriness of the system
Captured snapshot Sˆv Contents of captured memory snapshot with v being the time
taken to capture the snapshot
Taint f f is defined as the memory taint caused by the forensic in-
trospection agent
Table 2.2: Definitions
2.4 Taint and Blurriness
Although existing tools and techniques have trouble with capturing certain forms of volatile
information, they are also subject to capturing inconsistent snapshots taken while the sys-
tem is running. To quantify these effects, we measure forensic taint and blurriness.
Taint and blurriness are concepts related to the use of forensic tools. Taint is a measure-
ment of change in the system, in-memory or on-disk, induced by the use of a forensic tool.
In this section, we only consider in-memory taint because BitBlocker (Chapter 6) elim-
inates disk taint by blocking writes. Blurriness refers to the inconsistency of a memory
snapshot taken while a system is running.
These quantities can be reasoned about using the formalism described earlier. As a
system’s state Si changes in response to operating system event EOS to Si+1, a forensic
imager capturing the contents of memory would take an inconsistent snapshot over the
capture interval due to the arrival of these events. The captured image would be a blend
of the states visited during the capture process. Likewise, running a forensic acquisition
tool may induce an event EF to transition the state from Si → Si+1. Since this transition
was induced by an external event from the forensic investigator to capture the contents of
memory deliberately, we consider this state change as one that induces taint.
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More precisely, let St be the contents of memory at any given instant of time t. The state
of a system changes over a period of time due to the natural course of running processes
and we define this as the natural drift of the system, δ. When a traditional live forensic tool
attempts to take a snapshot of the system, there is a difference between what is captured, Sˆv
and the true snapshot St, where v represents the time taken to capture the snapshot. There
are two reasons for this difference: the first being δv the natural drift over the time period
when the snapshot was being acquired (v) and the second due to the footprint f of the
forensic tool. We define the former as the blurriness of the snapshot and the latter quantity
to be the taint caused by the forensic tool. Table 2.2 captures these definitions in a concise
form. In general, there are two ways to obtain a snapshot of the machine’s state: active
techniques and passive techniques. Active techniques involve the use of an internal agent
on the machine, such as Encase or dd, which may leave an undesired footprint. Passive
techniques operate outside the domain of the machine and do not affect its operation, one
such example is VM introspection. When a passive acquisition tool is used, the relationship
Sˆv = St + δv indicates that the approximate snapshot differs from the true snapshot due to
the blurriness δv. In contrast, when an active forensic tool is used, Sˆv = St+ f + δv, where
f represents taint and δv represents blurriness. Collectively, these quantities are a measure
of the error in the snapshot acquisition process. Taint can result from the direct action of
forensic tools or indirect effects induced in the system through the use of these tools. We
call the former first-order taint and the latter second-order taint. First-order taint can result
from loading the forensic tool into memory and second-order taint can result from system
effects such as file buffering due to the effects of a forensic tool writing a file to disk.
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Chapter 3
Measuring the Volatility of Evidence
To quantify more precisely the residual evidence available and the effects of blurriness, we
developed a tool to instrument how applications use memory. Our tool, Cafegrind1[26], is
an extension to the Valgrind memory checker. Cafegrind instruments all memory accesses
and allocation activities. Using this tool, we were able to determine that a significant corpus
of applications exhibit data retention properties desirable for volatile memory forensics.
We ran Cafegrind on several key applications including Firefox, Tor and Konqueror.
Our results suggest that these applications can hold potential evidence for quite a lengthy
period of time, even when privacy modes such as private browsing are activated. As a
result, there is a wealth of evidence to be gathered by using these methods. We briefly
summarize the key findings of Cafegrind here and a more detailed discussion of Cafegrind
can be found in Appendix A. Chapter 7 presents a more thorough evaluation of the taint
and blurriness characteristics of our tools against the state of the art.
Cafegrind quantifies empirically the longevity and blurriness of evidence by instru-
menting creation/deletion and access/modification events. As a program runs, Cafegrind
determines the type of allocated objects on the fly by using the type inference algorithm
described in Appendix A. This information is used to build a live object map of all active
objects in memory and their links to other objects. Each allocated object is then carefully
watched by the framework to monitor for accesses and modifications as the program is
running. Due to efficiency reasons, we only track object-level accesses instead of member-
level accesses, although the latter can be done with a small amount of effort albeit with a
1Cafegrind: C/C++ Analysis Forensic Engine for (Val)grind
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Quantity Description
Internal blurriness Internal uncertainty of an object due to object
updates. This is measured in terms of write ve-
locity and write fraction.
Program lifetime (Ω) Time interval from program start to termination
Natural object lifetime (ω) Time between malloc() and free() for an allo-
cated object
Residual object lifetime/Freed age(τ ) Time between free() and the first write that clob-
bers any byte of a freed object
Write velocity (λ) The rate of change of an object defined as #writes
ω
Write fraction (α) A measure of the relative frequency of writes.
Defined as #writes
#reads+#writes
Key diagonal Diagonal in freed age vs. age plots where ω +
τ = Ω; these objects persist for the lifetime of
the program.
Table 3.1: Internal blurriness definitions
performance penalty.
These measurements enable us to quantify object lifetime and modification rate. We
define natural object lifetime as the span of time between an allocation and deallocation
request. In contrast, residual object lifetime is the amount of time between a deallocation
request and subsequent destruction of residual object data caused by writing new data to
the recycled memory location.
Write Velocity, λ, is a measure of internal forensic blurriness(as opposed to systemic
external blurriness). Internal blurriness, in contrast to external blurriness defined in Section
2.4, is a measure of the rate of change of an object. We assume that most objects are small
enough to be captured instantly, so inconsistency due to delays in capturing are relatively
small. This quantity provides a measure of how frequently data is updated in an object and
how much historic data may have been destroyed by the process of updating. For instance,
this is important when assessing the fidelity of data found in a cache object. Some entries
in the cache will be very old while others may be fresh. The “internal blurriness” of the
cache object provides a measure of these qualities. Likewise, blurriness can be defined for
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types where an aggregate summary of blurriness is measured for all instances of a type.
To quantify internal blurriness further, we also measure the fraction of write accesses to
data structures called the Write Fraction, α. This quantity measures the percentage of
write accesses to a data structure and it is defined as the number of writes divided by the
total number of accesses (reads+writes). A write fraction of 0 means that the structure is
never initialized or written to. In contrast, a write fraction of 1 implies that the structure
is never read. For some messaging buffers, a write fraction of 0.5 can be expected as the
message is written once and read once. Smaller numbers imply that a structure is more
read-heavy, while larger numbers imply that an object is updated frequently. Objects with
a high write fraction exhibit larger amounts of internal blurriness. Table 3.1 summarizes
these quantities.
Empirically, we have found that locks tend to be slightly read-heavy since a lock is only
written to when it is successfully acquired, however it can be read many times as clients
attempt to acquire the lock. We also found that some animated UI elements can be updated
more frequently than the global UI renders the state and incoming input/network buffers
can drop events when they are overloaded, so a written data item may never be read from
the ring buffer under these circumstances making these structures generally write-heavy.
On the other hand, read-heavy structures include program code and global settings such as
the time zone that are written once and frequently accessed.
3.1 Applications
Using these volatility metrics, we studied the following applications and their data types to
characterize the emergent behavior of residual evidence.
Firefox
Firefox is a popular web browser that supports a private browsing mode. When Firefox
starts up, it allocates a number of singleton UI and bookkeeping structures. As the user
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opens web pages, Firefox creates a number of HTML parsers using the Gecko rendering
engine [27], XML parsers, UI widgets and graphical image renderers for PNG/JPG im-
ages present on a webpage. The purpose of our study is to characterize the lifetime of
these ephemeral elements. This measurement provides a rough estimate on the types and
quantities of available forensic evidence.
Figure 3.1 shows a histogram of the distribution of object ages for a single run of Fire-
fox. Our test loads http://www.wsj.com and we close the browser as soon as the page
finishes loading. Many of the objects allocated by Firefox have a long lifespan. This is
likely to be the case for several reasons. First, many of the elements created by Firefox are
UI elements that last for the duration of the browsing session. Secondly, Firefox is very
conservative in cleaning up old objects because the user may elect to navigate backward
in the page history. This behavior has also been reported in [28]. Thirdly, Firefox uses a
custom allocator and smart pointers to manage reference counts of shared objects. There-
fore the lifetime of an object cannot be easily determined. This is because page elements
are shared with the JavaScript engine and web plugins and elements cannot be destroyed
Figure 3.1: Firefox: Object age histogram (Valgrind ticks)
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while they are in use. To meet these design requirements, objects are managed by using
a reference counting approach. Finally, the histogram appears relatively flat because the
instrumented browser renders objects very slowly. Cafegrind instrumentation added extra
overhead to Firefox to slow the page load time from 3-5 seconds to around 6-10 minutes,
so the histogram has been dilated horizontally.
Outside of private browsing mode, we found the structures in Table 3.2 to be key to
the operation of Firefox. The list is extensive, so we present an abbreviated list of the
most important types. The items in this table were selected because to highlight specific
data strucutes that are likely to contain evidence. These structures have one or more of the
following properties: longevity, high ASCII content, or high entropy.
Tor
Tor is a privacy guard tool that anonymizes web sessions by using an “Onion routing”
network that hides the identity and location of the user behind a sophisticated peer to peer
network. When a client makes a network request, Tor encrypts the request in a layered
message so that intermediate routers cannot access the contents of the message. Only the
originating host and the “exit node” can access the plaintext data. The exit node is the final
node in the network route where the network flow connects to the wider Internet. Packets
flowing through this node are not protected by Tor and thus this presents an opportunity for
forensic software to monitor a connection’s plaintext content.
From a forensic perspective, we are interested primarily in latent information that may
have been persisted as part of a past request. This scenario is useful because a suspect
may boot off a non-persistent bootable CD to specifically run Tor without persisting any
evidence to disk. In this case, the only evidence available may be found in a memory dump.
Our analysis confirms that Tor can persist information while it is operating and this
latent information may contain historic evidence revealing the browsing habits of the user
and any traffic that passes through the exit node.
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Konqueror
Konqueror is a Linux file manager and web browser based on the popular WebKit
framework [29] used by many browsers such as Google Chrome, Apple Safari and Mobile
Safari. We tested Konqueror because it uses Webkit under the hood and any insights gained
from this analysis are likely to be applicable to other Webkit-based browsers.
3.1.1 Memory allocator behavior
Doug Lea’s malloc() allocator in GLIBC 2.x [30] is a balanced memory allocator imple-
mentation that fares well in terms of speed, space efficiency and latency. This allocator
tends to have the following properties(documented in the source code): small allocations
are made from a pool of quickly recycled chunks, large allocations (≥ 512 bytes) are made
in FIFO order, and very large (≥ 128 KB) are made directly using system memory facil-
ities such as mmap. These policies are encouraging for data recovery since large buffers
and cache objects tend to be allocated in large pools that aren’t frequently recycled.
Figure 3.2: Firefox: Age vs. Freed age bubble figure
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Figure 3.3: Konqueror: Age vs. Freed age bubble figure
Figure 3.4: Tor: Age vs. Freed age bubble figure
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3.1.2 Residual Object lifetime
Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 show how long freed objects last in memory before they are ulti-
mately reallocated and clobbered. The residual lifetime, or freed age τ is a measure of this
Figure 3.5: Firefox: Age histogram
Figure 3.6: Konqueror: Age histogram
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quantity and we define it as the length of time before a single byte of the freed object is
clobbered. Although the residual age of an object may be short, if the allocation was large,
it is likely to contain significant amounts of residual evidence, however, this evidence may
Figure 3.7: Tor: Age histogram
Figure 3.8: Firefox: Freed Age
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be of low fidelity as it has been partially overwritten by new data.
Figure 3.2 shows a plot of freed age τ vs. age ω for Firefox in the unit of Valgrind
virtual CPU cycles. The size of the bubble is proportional to the size of the allocation.
Figure 3.9: Konqueror: Freed Age
Figure 3.10: Tor: Freed Age
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Recall that age is the natural lifetime of an object from allocation to deallocation and that
freed age represents the amount of time that a residual object lasts before the memory
area is reused. To the far right of the graph, we see objects with the maximal lifetime Ω.
These objects persisted for the length of the session and they were deallocated because the
program exited. Along the diagonal, objects have an age + freed age that represents an
aggregate lifetime equal to the length of the program. Thus, ω + τ = Ω for the diagonal.
We call this line the key diagonal where evidence lingers for the duration of the program
lifetime. These objects were freed earlier, but their residual data persisted until the program
terminated. Objects below the line have a shorter lifespan depending on the distance from
the origin, as the available lifetime of the object is ω + τ .
From this bubble plot, we can see that there are some large allocations on the Y-axis
that have a short natural lifetime, but long residual lifetime. This phenomenon is likely
an artifact of the behavior of the memory allocator described earlier. Around the middle,
a large number of objects are freed because Firefox uses a multi-stage teardown. First,
pages/tabs are freed before the main UI exits. Figure 3.5 confirms this observation with
three peaks. The first peak around zero shows that a good number of objects have very
short lifetimes. The middle peak is when the tab/page gets torn down as part of the exit
process and the final peak on the right is when the rest of the UI is torn down. The final
plot of freed age shown in Figure 3.8 conveys similar information and reinforces the data
shown in the other plots.
Similarly, Figure 3.3 shows a plot of the freed age vs. age for Konqueror. Unlike
Firefox, this figure shows that large allocations tend to linger longer in Konqueror. We
have not examined why this is the case; perhaps Firefox is more aggressive in cleaning
up, or maybe Konqueror tends to reuse large objects. The large points near the origin
imply that some large objects are allocated and deallocated rapidly, but their contents are
overwritten fairly quickly. For instance, the RegEx parser exhibits this behavior. Likewise,
objects along the key diagonal represent objects that persist until the program terminates.
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Figures 3.6 and 3.9 depict histograms for Konqueror’s age and freed age respectively. Not
surprisingly, a large number of objects live on either end. Either the object is a temporary
ephemeral allocation, or it lasts until the program exits. Unlike Firefox, Konqueror seems
to clean up much more quickly at the end. Based on our observations, it appears that
Firefox actually preserves data better than Konqueror because the latter tends to recycle
large allocations more frequently. However, without knowing the exact details of how these
programs work, it is hard to make generalizations about the actual longevity of residual
evidence.
Finally, Tor is shown in Figure 3.4. Tor is interesting because large allocations tend to
linger on the key diagonal, which is promising for evidence retrieval. Although some large
allocations are freed quickly, their contents tend to linger for a long time afterward. Big
objects on the key diagonal here are mostly large character buffers. Parallel diagonals in the
figure reflect how Tor cleans up when it exits. Connections in Tor are circuit-based. When
Tor exits, it shuts down one connection at a time. The act of doing so frees resources and
the parallel diagonals illustrate how each connection shuts down. Each parallel line has the
relationship: age+ freedage = shutdown time. Tor’s age histogram is relatively normal
as depicted in Figure 3.7 with many short-lived allocations on the left, and some longer-
term allocations on the right. However, its freed age shown in Figure 3.10 is reflective of
the way that it manages its connections. These results are rather encouraging for forensic
investigators and perhaps a bit shocking for privacy advocates. We have shown that a
memory dump of a running Tor process does not necessarily scrub unused memory as
aggressively as it can, otherwise the freed age would be unequivocally zero.
3.2 Characterizing Evidence
The data types discussed in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 were identified using our evidence gath-
ering techniques that highlight relevant data types based on content and role. We consider
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attributes such as ASCII text content, entropy level and pointer content. More details of
these heuristics can be found in Appendix A.
By performing these data extraction experiments, we developed some rules of thumb
for locating evidence. First, it appears that many applications use gzip to compress network
streams. Finding gzip inflation buffers in memory appears to be a good strategy for recov-
ering data, however, these buffers are frequently reused and their contents are unlikely to
contain much historic data. Secondly, Firefox and Konqueror use smart pointers to manage
objects. Looking for these smart pointers in memory can help highlight pointers to data.
Third, applications tend to use container objects such as STL lists or tree nodes to manage
important data. Locating key entry points to these internal structures generally leads to
other interesting nodes. Finally, it seems like data is duplicated in many places. We found
that after data has been decompressed, it is parsed in the XML layers and duplicates can
appear in the caching and UI layers. Recognizing these patterns in the structure can help
to identify information more accurately. Furthermore, these structures are often linked by
pointers to each other.
More specifically, Table 3.2 shows data structures for Firefox. Not surprisingly, the
objects with the longest lifetimes include the JavaScript hash table, garbage collector and
the scoped XPCOM startup objects. Objects with the shortest lifetime include temporary
helper objects such as parsers and decompressors. In terms of internal blurriness, objects
with the highest write fraction include the garbage collector, which also has a high write
velocity. Likewise, the decompressor has a write fraction of 34.05 and a write velocity
of 300 million along with a short lifetime. This implies that the decompressor has a high
turnover rate. Both Firefox and Tor use a data structure called passwd which is used by
the getpwnam() function to return information about the currently active user. This data
structure does not actually contain a web password.
Table 3.4 shows the statistics for Konqueror. Likewise, UI elements and settings persist
the longest. Many objects in Konqueror are wrapped in smart pointers called DataRef(s)
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and these are managed by the internal reference counting framework. Since Konqueror
makes extensive use of polymorphism using the QObject base class, analysis was signifi-
cantly more time consuming because Cafegrind identified a less specific type. Like Firefox,
Konqueror also makes compressed HTTP requests, but the write fraction was significantly
lower at 13.55%. Perhaps the Firefox HTTP compression library is more integrated into
the application whereas Konqueror seems to use gzip directly to decompress data.
Finally, Table 3.3 shows the statistics for Tor. Not surprisingly, most interesting struc-
tures in Tor involve encryption and their lifetime reflects the role of the object. For instance,
bootstrap information such as the list of trusted directory services is initialized at the be-
ginning. Individual ciphers are created as necessary for each connection and SHA state
is created early on to authenticate the peer routing nodes. Expectedly, the SSL I/O buffer
write ratio was relative high because only part of the buffer was filled and the rest was
memset to 0.
Our findings confirm the observations of Chow’s TaintBochs work [31] that significant
amounts of evidence can persist in memory for quite a length of time. Our more recent
study extends upon Chow’s work by considering object types in the analysis instead of
just raw taint bytes which are type agnostic. In contrast to TaintBochs, we do not track
system-level taint because we are concentrating on measuring application-level behaviors.
TaintBochs has already shown that the Linux kernel can persist sensitive data such as pass-
words and encryption keys in keyboard buffers, network ring buffers, flip buffers and the
SLAB allocator used by the Linux kernel.
The empirical study of object lifetimes and modification rates here is meant only as a
rough measure of these quantities. Modern programs are extremely complex and their be-
havior often relies on external input. Furthermore, measuring these quantities is known to
be complicated because browsers such as Firefox use a COM-like interface[32] that relies
on reference count-based garbage collection. Browsers generally use such an approach be-
cause page elements are shared between scripts, plugins and the page itself[28]. Therefore,
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these objects are only freed when the reference count drops to zero. Due to the involvement
of multiple parties, these elements can persist for quite a length of time, but measuring the
duration of this timeframe is very challenging and session-dependent.
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Table 3.2: Firefox data structure lifetime and blurriness
Structure Name Role Lifetime(s) [%] Write Fraction Write velocity (x1000)
GCGraphBuilder Garbage collector 31.76 [0.20] 87.29 20,083,945
GStringstr Glib smart string 1436.00 [11.80] 26.90 30
JSScript Javascript engine 4964.35 [41.10] 8.73 8.45
JSHashEntry Hash table 7940.00 [65.70] 12.50 91
nsAttrValue A struct that represents the value (type
and data) of an attribute
4,629.00 [38.30] 17.08 8
nsCAutoString Smart string 729.90 [6.04] 33.86 174
nsCOMPtr< nsIContent > A node of content in a document’s con-
tent model
5,470.00 [45.27] 25.36 16
nsCOMPtr< nsICSSParser > CSS Parser 220.00 [1.80] 41.80 1583
nsCOMPtr< nsIURI > Interface for a uniform resource identifier
with i18n support
1171.00 [9.69] 27.85 9,992
nsEntry Entry field 205.81 [1.70] 29.33 180
nsHTTPCompressConv HTTP compression stream 54.72 [0] 34.05 300,000,000
nsXPTCVariant XPT call helper for cross lan-
guage/method calls
1045.00 [8.60] 24.80 27
passwd Password from getpwnam() 0.81 [0] 26.05 562,809
png struct PNG image 1.16 [0] 31.40 1,319,082
Token String tokenizer 938.00 [7.80] 16.40 548
ScopedXPCOMStartup Manages XPCOM objects 9180.00 [75.90] 18.10 375
XML ParserStruct XML Parser 1.80 [0] 42.90 1,018,959
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Table 3.3: Tor data structure lifetime and blurriness
Structure Name Role Lifetime(s) [%] Write Fraction Write velocity
(anonymous).cache info Cache information with info about
clients
419.53 [34.80] 11.56 93.96
bio f buffer OpenSSL buffered I/O 55.46 [0.05] 75.83 1510.06
dh st Diffie Hellman 4.25 [0.04] 29.25 156.52
rsa st RSA state 645.02 [53.50] 5.06 100.54
ssl session SSL session 160.22 [13.30] 100 353.81
trusted dir server Trusted directory server 1205.38 [99.90] 64.40 18.73
SHAState SHA state 921.69 [76.40] 33.33 14787.48
ssl cipher st SSL cipher state 0.017 [0] 11.88 7613274.17
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Table 3.4: Konqueror data structure lifetime and blurriness
Structure Name Role Lifetime (s) [%] Write Fraction Write velocity
DataRef< type > Smart Pointer 2.49 [0.40] 18.73 20781.24
internal state Gzip state for compressed HTTP re-
quests
82.05 [12.76] 13.55 5680172.31
KIconEngine Icon engine 293.81 [45.69] 41.17 23.82
KUrl URL 60.13 [9.35] 11.76 1157.80
passwd Passwd from getpwnam() 0.12 [0] 26.05 3768948.12
png struct PNG image 0.15 [0] 9.50 559243.39
QLinkedListNode< KHTMLPart∗ > List of embedded browser sessions 290.72 [45.21] 30.77 13.76
QVector< type > Dynamic vector 6.57 [1.02] 30.25 6922.30
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Chapter 4
Forenscope Overview
In contrast to traditional live forensic approaches which rely on running an agent on the host
system, Forenscope utilizes the principle of introspection to provide a consistent analysis
environment free of taint and blurriness which we term as the golden state1. In this state,
the system is essentially quiescent and queries can be made to analyze the system. As a
result, analysis modules can access in-memory data structures introspectively and query
operating system services. Residual evidence described in Chapter 3 can be inspected and
gathered with high fidelity.
The investigator activates Forenscope by forcing a reset where the state of the machine
is preserved by memory remanence in the DRAM chips. Then, the investigator boots off
the Forenscope media that performs forensic analysis on the latent state of the system and
restores the functionality of the system for further live analysis. Forenscope is designed to
work around security mechanisms by interposing a lightweight analysis platform beneath
the operating system. For example, in incident response, the machine may be controlled by
malicious software and the operating system cannot be trusted. The observation capabilities
afforded by Forenscope offer additional visibility in these scenarios.
4.1 Memory Remanence
Modern memory chips are composed of capacitors that store binary values using charge
states. Over time, these capacitors leak charge and must be refreshed periodically. To
1This state has no nodes on the untrusted path described in Section 2.2.1
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save power, these chips are designed to retain their values as long as possible, especially
in mobile devices such as laptops and cell phones. Contrary to common belief, the act
of rebooting or shutting down a computer often does not completely clear the contents of
memory. Link and May [33] were the first to show that current memory technology exhib-
ited remanence properties back in 1979. More recently, Gutmann [34] elaborated on the
properties of DRAM memory remanence. Halderman et al. [35] recently showed that these
chips can retain their contents for tens of seconds at room temperature and the contents can
persist for several minutes when the RAM chips are cooled by spraying an inverted can
of commonly available computer duster spray over them. The liquid coolants found in
these duster sprays freeze the chips and slow the natural rate of bit decay. Forenscope uti-
lizes memory remanence properties to preserve the full system state to allow recovery to a
point where introspection can be performed. We refer the reader to [35, 36, 37] for a more
detailed analysis of memory remanence and the architecture of computer memory.
NB: The concept of memory remanence discussed in this section is distinctly different
from the concept of residual data discussed in Chapter 3. The remanence here is an artifact
of the physical properties of memory whereas the residual effect is purely an artifact of
software design.
4.2 PC Memory
In this section, we will describe our study of post-boot up memory remanence charac-
teristics on several X86-based systems. Even if a system’s complete memory image is
preserved at the instant that a computer is restarted, portions of the image are clobbered
when the BIOS executes. When a PC is booted, the processor begins the initialization se-
quence by executing startup code from the BIOS. The BIOS is responsible for initializing
the core hardware, performing any required selection of boot devices, and loading the boot
loader or operating system from the selected boot device.
35
0x00000000
Conventional Memory
0x000A0000
0x00100000
VGA/BIOS
Extended Memory
Mem Size
Figure 4.1: PC Memory map
Table 4.1: Regions of extended memory overwritten or not recoverable after BIOS execu-
tion
Computer Type Memory
size
Overwritten or unrecoverable extended mem-
ory
HP/Compaq
8510w
Laptop 2 GB 1 MB @ 0x200000, 128 bytes @ 0x300000
HP/Compaq
Presario
2800T
Laptop 392 MB 170 KB @ 0x100000
Lenovo
Thinkpad
T61p
Laptop 2 GB 3 MB @ 0x100000, 84 bytes @ various
locations
IBM Thinkpad
T41p
Laptop 2 GB 3 MB @ 0x100000, 84 bytes @ various
locations
Dell Inspiron
600M
Laptop 512 MB 512 MB - completely reset
Dell Inspiron
8600
Laptop 1 GB 1 GB - completely reset
IBM IntelliS-
tation M Pro
Desktop 512 MB 3 MB @ 0x100000, 856 bytes @ various lo-
cations (ECC off)
Bochs [38] Emulator 128 MB none
QEMU [39] Emulator 128 MB none
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On a PC, there are two boot modes: cold and warm. A cold boot is performed when
the machine is initially powered on. Cold boots perform significant hardware initialization
and optional memory testing, which can overwrite portions of physical memory. Warm
boots can be triggered by the reset button (if available) or by a reboot instruction from the
running operating system. On a warm boot, there is no interruption in power and memory
is usually left intact. In particular, a reboot initiated by the Linux kernel sets a CMOS flag
that instructs the BIOS to bypass memory tests.
When booting, the processor starts running in X86 real mode and can initially ad-
dress up to one-megabyte of memory. Only the first 640 kilobytes of addressable memory
is RAM. The remainder of the one-megabyte addressable region is reserved for memory
mapped I/O devices such as the display and other peripherals. This limitation is a conse-
quence of the history and evolution of the PC architecture. Figure 4.1 shows the physical
memory layout of a typical PC. The first 640 kilobytes of memory (up to 0x000A0000) is
generally referred to as “Conventional Memory”, while memory above the 1 MB mark is
known as “Extended Memory.” When the BIOS executes, it runs in conventional memory
while it performs initialization and loads the boot sector from a disk.
On some machines, the system and peripheral BIOSes also access and overwrite select
portions of extended memory. In order to perform a more detailed analysis of this issue,
we have developed a RAM tester tool that analyzes the memory preservation characteris-
tics of a computer. The tester is a stand-alone program that is loaded off a CD and uses
only conventional memory to operate. The tester fills extended memory with a bit pattern,
reboots the computer and checks for regions that have been overwritten or are unrecover-
able. Table 4.1 presents the results of running our tool on several machines without ECC.
These results show that various machines that differ in age and origin only overwrite a few
megabytes of memory and can support memory preservation. The characteristic clobbering
behavior of various machines is possibly a consequence of different BIOS implementations
or hardware configuration discrepancies. We have not attempted to reverse engineer the
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BIOSes on these machines to determine the exact reasons for these differences; however,
we have noticed that on test machines, the absence or presence of various PCI expansion
cards helps to determine the clobber signature of memory. Therefore, we believe that part
of this effect can be attributed to the actions of expansion card firmware.
Our experiments indicate that machines which use ECC memory do not retain software-
accessible memory contents after a restart. All reads from ECC memory after a reset always
return 0 because ECC memory has parity bits that must be initialized by the BIOS at boot
time [35]. Thus, computers that use ECC memory do not support memory remanence-
based forensic techniques. We observed that disabling ECC functionality on ECC memory
modules using BIOS settings makes these modules behave like non-ECC memory modules.
The reader is referred to [35] for a more detailed analysis of memory remanence effects in
DRAM chips.
Another important characteristic to consider is the behavior of the processor cache dur-
ing a soft restart. This concern is significant in the context of a write-back cache, since
uncommitted data may be lost across a reboot. Our experiments on hardware indicate that
the cache is disabled by the processor and transparently recovered after a reset. We believe
that when caching is re-enabled, the contents of the cache are preserved and remain intact
for the final restoration to the original executing environment. When Forenscope re-enables
virtual memory and caching, special care is taken to avoid clearing or invalidating cache
lines.
4.3 Activation
Forenscope currently supports two methods of activation. The first is based on a watchdog
timer reset and the second is through a forced reboot.
For incident response, or use with a honeypot, a watchdog timer may be used to activate
Forenscope periodically to audit the machine’s state and check for the presence of stealth
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malware threats. Watchdog timers are commonly used in embedded systems to detect erro-
neous conditions such as machine crashes or lockups. These timers contain a count down
clock that must be refreshed periodically. If the system crashes, the watchdog software
will fail to refresh the clock. Once the clock counts down to zero, the watchdog timer
will promptly issue a hardware reset signal to the machine causing it to warm-reboot in
the hopes that the operating system will recover from the erroneous condition upon a fresh
start. On the SEL-1102 computer, the built-in watchdog timer is programmable via a serial
port interface and the contents of DRAM memory are not cleared after a reboot initiated
by the watchdog timer reset signal.
On the other hand, a forensic investigator may encounter a machine that is locked by
a screensaver or login screen. In this situation, Forenscope can be activated by forcing a
reboot. Some operating systems such as Linux and Windows can be configured to reboot
or produce a crash dump by pressing a hotkey. These key sequences are often used for
debugging and are enabled by default in many Linux distributions. In Linux, the alt-sysrq-
b hotkey sequence forces an immediate reboot. If these debug keys are disabled, then a
reset may be forced by activating the hardware reset switch. Forenscope supports multiple
modes of operation for versatility. After the machine has been rebooted forcefully, the
Forenscope kernel is booted instead of the incumbent operating system.
A successful attempt depends on the ability of the target computer to start from an
external boot device. While this functionality can be disabled or password protected in the
BIOS, many machines still have this ability enabled by default to allow the use of recovery
CDs by technical support personnel. Even if the BIOS policy restricts booting from an
alternate device, it is possible that a boot loader installed on the host system can be used to
circumvent the system policy to load Forenscope from an external device if the loader isn’t
properly configured for security. All Linux distributions use a boot loader and we have
verified that one of the most popular boot loaders, GRUB, can be instructed (at runtime) to
boot from a different device irrespective of the BIOS boot policy.
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Chapter 5
Forenscope Design
Instead of booting afresh, Forenscope alters the boot control flow to perform its analysis.
Figure 5.1 illustrates this process. After the machine restarts, it boots off a CD or USB stick
with the Forenscope media. The machine then enters the golden state monitor mode that
suspends execution and provides a clean external view of the machine state. By booting
into the golden state, Forenscope establishes a clean chain of trust(Chapter 2.2.1) so that no
components of the target system provide critical services in the analysis process. To explain
how the monitor works, we first describe the operating states of the X86 architecture. When
a traditional PC boots, the processor starts in real mode and executes the BIOS. The BIOS
then loads the boot loader that in turn loads the operating system. During the boot sequence,
the operating system first enables protected mode to access memory above the 1 MB
mark and then sets up page tables to enable virtual memory. This is the OS bootstrapping
stage. Once the OS is booted, it starts scheduling programs and user-level applications.
Forenscope interposes on this boot sequence and first establishes a bootstrap environment
residing in the lower 640 KB rung of legacy conventional memory and then it reconstructs
the state of the running machine. Forenscope has full control of the machine and its view
is untainted by any configuration settings from the incumbent operating system because it
uses a trustworthy private set of page tables; thus rootkits and malware that have infected
the machine cannot interfere with operations in this state.
Next, Forenscope obtains forensically accurate memory dumps of the system and runs
various kinds of analyses described later in this chapter. To maintain integrity, Forenscope
does not rely on any services from the underlying operating system. Instead, it makes direct
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Figure 5.1: Boot control flow for normal and Forenscope boot paths
calls to the system’s BIOS to read and write to the disk. Therefore, Forenscope is resistant
to malware that impedes the correct operation of hardware devices. The initial forensic
analysis modules are executed in this state and then Forenscope restores the operation of
the incumbent operating system. This entire process is executed in a matter of seconds and
the system is restored fully without delay to minimize disruption.
5.1 Reviving the Operating System
To revive the incumbent operating system, Forenscope needs to restore the hardware and
software state of the system to ”undo” the effects of the reboot. Hardware devices are reset
by the BIOS as part of the boot process. Some of these devices must be reconfigured before
the incumbent operating system is restored because they were used by Forenscope or the
BIOS during initialization. To do so, Forenscope first re-initializes core devices such as the
hard drive and interrupt controller and then assumes full control of these devices for opera-
tion in its clean environment. Before resuming the operating system, Forenscope scans the
PCI bus and gathers a list of hardware devices. Each hardware device is matched against
an internal database and if an entry is found, Forenscope calls its own reinitialization func-
tion for the particular hardware device. If no reinitialization function is found, Forenscope
looks up the device class and calls the operating system’s generic recovery function for
that device class. Many devices such as network cards and disk drives have facilities for
handling errant conditions on buggy hardware. These devices typically have a timeout re-
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covery function that can revive the hardware device in the event that it stops responding.
We have found that calling these recovery functions is usually sufficient to recover most
hardware devices. In Linux, 86 out of the 121 (71%) PCI network drivers implement this
interface and all IDE device drivers support a complete device reset. For instance, the IBM
uses an Intel Pro/100 card and the SEL-1102 uses a built-in AMD PCnet/32 chip. Both
machines rely on calling the tx timeout function to revive the network. We use a two-
stage process to restore the operating system environment. The first stage reconstructs the
processor state where the values of registers are extracted and altered to roll back the effects
of the restart. Our algorithm scans the active kernel stack and symbol information from the
kernel for call chain information as shown in Figure 5.2. Forenscope uses this information
to reconstruct the processor’s state. In the alt-sysrq-b case, the interrupt handler calls
the keyboard handler that in turn invokes the emergency sysrq-handler. The processor’s
register state is saved on the stack and restored by using state recovery algorithms such as
[36, 40]. More details are available in Section5.3. If the alt-sysrq-b hotkey is dis-
abled, Forenscope supports an alternate method of activation based on pressing a physical
reset switch. In this case, Forenscope assumes that the system is under light load and that
the processor spends most of its time in the kernel’s idle loop. In this loop, most kernels
repeatedly call the X86 HLT instruction to put the processor to sleep. Since the register
values at this point are very predictable, Forenscope simply restores the instruction pointer,
EIP, to point to the idle loop itself and other registers accordingly. Once the state has been
reconstructed, Forenscope reloads the processor with this information and enables the page
tables to restore the state of virtual memory.
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Figure 5.2: Stack layout at the time of reboot
Figure 5.3: Idle stack layout at the time of reboot
5.2 Memory Map Characteristics
By running our RAM tester and analyzing the source code of Linux, we have determined
that the contents of conventional memory have no operational effect on the system, even if
the values are completely clobbered. This is because memory is not contiguous, and con-
tains several holes around the 1 MB and 16 MB regions that are reserved for various devices
such as expansion ROMs, legacy video cards, DMA regions and BIOSes. Since Linux pri-
marily uses extended memory, any corrupted kernel regions in this memory presents a
significant challenge for Forenscope.
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We also performed some experiments to determine the extent to which Windows XP
relies on conventional memory. In our experiments, we zeroed the contents of conventional
memory from a Windows XP machine running in a VMware environment. In each case,
Windows continued to run unaffected and DOS applications launched from the cmd.exe
interpreter continued to work correctly. We believe that these experiments succeeded be-
cause Windows XP does not use conventional memory for DOS applications because it
uses the Virtual Dos Machine (VDM)[41] to emulate DOS support and this environment
actually uses extended memory to support the virtualized conventional memory. Dumping
the contents of conventional memory also returned all zeroes in the Windows XP machine,
which leads us to believe that conventional memory serves no operational purpose.
In some cases where portions of kernel code are overwritten, Forenscope can reload
the kernel code section from the disk; however, when kernel data is corrupted, complete
system recovery is non-trivial and we do not attempt to address this problem. Thus, our
experiments assume that vital kernel data remains intact. Chapter 6 discusses strategies for
dealing with such kernel data corruption.
5.3 System Resuscitation
Forenscope is designed to revive a system’s software environment and hardware devices
through resuscitation. After a machine is forcefully rebooted, the investigator reconfig-
ures the target machine’s BIOS, if necessary, to load Forenscope. Forenscope is loaded
into conventional memory and only uses memory below the 640-kilobyte limit in order to
avoid inflicting further damage to the preserved memory above 1 megabyte. Forenscope
currently uses a two stage loading process. The first stage uses a slightly modified version
of the GRUB boot loader [42] to load any required support files off the disk and the rest of
Forenscope into memory. This modified boot loader is part of Forenscope and resides on
the investigator’s boot media; it should not be confused with the boot loader on the target
44
Table 5.1: Recovering register state
Register Description Source
EAX,EBX,ECX,EDX General Purpose Restored from stack
ESI,EDI General Purpose Restored from stack
ESP,EBP Stack, Frame Pointer SysRq handler stack or idle
loop stack
EIP Instruction Pointer SysRq handler stack or idle
loop stack
EFL Flags Restored from stack
CPL Privilege Level Kernel privilege level
CS,DS,SS Code, Data, Stack Segments Static value in kernel
ES,FS,GS Segment Registers Current task data structure
LDT,GDT Descriptor Tables Static value in kernel
TR Task Pointer Static value in kernel
CR0 Processor Settings Static known value
CR2 Page Fault Address Recovery not required
CR3 Page Table Pointer Current task data structure
CR4 Advanced Control Flags Static known value
machine. The second stage boot process executes the core system resuscitation code and
forensic payloads.
5.4 Software Resuscitation
In this section, we describe the process of resuscitating a Linux environment on a target
machine. Forenscope requires knowledge of kernel data structures and their layout (sym-
bol table) in the target Linux kernel in order to successfully revive a system. For example,
in order to restore the correct virtual memory mappings for Linux, Forenscope needs to
discover the address of the page tables of the interrupted task. Such information is incor-
porated into Forenscope by building it with Linux kernel header files and using symbol
information from the linked kernel. A compiled version of Forenscope is therefore only
100% effective against a specific kernel version and configuration. This is not a significant
limitation because most major Linux distributions do not update kernels frequently and
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few people build and run custom kernels. Forenscope can generally accommodate changes
in the kernel when it is recompiled; however, major Linux structural changes may require
some additional engineering effort to support. In cases where the information is not di-
rectly available, Forenscope scans the system symbol file, /boot/System.map to find the
necessary offsets to locate key kernel data structures. Since the format of these structures
doesn’t change often, Forenscope is able to cope with small changes.
The objective of software resuscitation is to fabricate a processor context (register state)
that can be used to resume execution of the host system environment. We present a scheme
that reconstructs a valid resume context for the Alt-SysRq-B reboot method (as discussed in
Chapter 4). The key idea is to load the processor registers with values that cause the SysRq
handler in Linux to mimic a return from the reboot function, as if it had no operational
effect. This allows execution to continue in spite of an actual reboot. The advantage of
using this approach to revive the kernel, as opposed to reviving the kernel from some other
entry point, is that the logical control flow in the host system is preserved and the semantics
of constructs such as locks and semaphores are respected.
In order to construct a valid resume context, it is necessary to understand the operation
of the Linux Magic SysRq debug system. The SysRq system in Linux is hooked into
the keyboard driver and called when the driver detects the Alt-SysRq hotkey sequence.
When the SysRq handler is executed, it acquires a spin lock and disables interrupts. In this
context, the system is guaranteed to have a very predictable register state and call chain.
We rely on these salient characteristics to construct a resume context safely.
Table 5.1 lists the various X86 registers and describes the data sources used to recon-
struct the values in each register. Forenscope first locates the stack that was in use at the
time of restart. Depending on the kernel configuration, this can be one of several known
stacks used by kernel threads and interrupt handlers. Figure 5.2 shows a glimpse of the
stack contents just prior to restart. A number of known frames exist on this stack prior
to executing the reboot code. These stack frames are scanned by Forenscope to recover
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register values to build a plausible resume context. Restore values for ESP and EBP are
obtained by locating the frame for the sysrq handle reboot() function on the stack. Then,
EIP is set to the return address of the emergency restart() frame. Now, the execution con-
text is prepared to synthesize a return from the reboot function as if the restart had been
magically rolled back.
The emergency restart() function does not have a return value and Forenscope does
not have to worry about restoring any of the general-purpose registers or processor flags.
Once the resume context is restored onto the processor, the return code in the function
sysrq handle reboot() restores the values of these registers from the stack where they were
saved in the function call preamble.
The values of the CS, DS and SS segment registers are constant within the kernel and
these constants are statically compiled into Forenscope, while the values of the ES, FS,
and GS registers are derived from the currently running task. Linux maintains a pointer to
the data structure representing the currently running task in a global variable. Forenscope
examines this variable and restores the ES, FS and GS registers with the values found in
this data structure.
LDT and GDT always maintain a constant value independent of the executing thread.
The task register, TR, holds relevant information about the current task. Linux uses soft-
ware context switching, so there is only one TR per CPU, and its constant value is loaded
by the kernel. All of these constant values are determined at build time and statically com-
piled into Forenscope. CR2 holds the fault address, which does not need to be recovered,
and CR3 is the page table pointer, which can be inferred from the current task’s virtual
memory data structures. This information is required to activate the task’s virtual memory
mappings in the MMU. The virtual address space is constructed by consulting the page
tables of CR3 and the values of the segment registers selected in the GDT and LDT tables.
Once Forenscope has constructed a valid resume context, it must load this context into
the processor and enable the new page tables. This poses an interesting problem because
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Figure 5.4: Forenscope state reconstruction algorithm
the code that reprograms the MMU to use the new set of page tables needs ensure that
the next prefetched instruction is available in the old and new address spaces, otherwise
the processor would generate an instruction fetch fault upon access. Unfortunately, Foren-
scope is loaded into conventional memory, which is not available in the standard kernel
virtual memory map. Forenscope circumvents this problem by creating a common tram-
poline memory area that is available in both address spaces. It copies the code that com-
pletes the context restore process into an unused portion of the Linux kernel’s log message
buffer. When Forenscope returns to the host environment, it executes this code to atomi-
cally switch the virtual address space and return to the original host environment. Figure
5.4 depicts the state reconstruction process.
There are some limitations on the types of functions that can be called by Forenscope
before it returns control to the kernel. Interrupts are disabled while Forenscope is run-
ning and it is essentially running in an atomic interrupt context; therefore, as with a real
kernel interrupt handler, no functions that might sleep or otherwise invoke schedule() can
be called. To work around this limitation, a standard Linux kernel API may be used to
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schedule an asynchronous callback to be run once interrupts are re-enabled; however, since
Forenscope will no longer be mapped into memory, the actual machine code for the call-
back must be copied into an area accessible from the kernel address space in the same way
that the trampoline code does. This technique is used by the ForenShell module discussed
in Section 6.
5.5 Hardware Resuscitation
Upon reboot, system hardware may be reinitialized to a state that is out of sync with the
expectations of the host Linux kernel. Forenscope needs to ensure that hardware devices
such as keyboards, disk controllers and Ethernet devices continue to work after the soft-
ware environment is revived. Surprisingly, Forenscope can rely on Linux to revive certain
devices automatically. In order to handle some classes of buggy or unresponsive hardware,
Linux includes code to retry operations or reinitialize devices upon an error. Forenscope
takes advantage of such support if it is available. For cases where Linux is unable to revive
hardware on its own, Forenscope incorporates custom code to assist resuscitation.
Forenscope’s hardware resuscitation process is similar to the actions performed by the
system when resuming from sleep or suspend mode. Normally, the operating system saves
resume structure state to a disk or memory area upon a suspend. These resume structures
describe the exact state of the machine at the time of suspend. Hardware devices and
the CPU are then shut down and their transient state is subsequently lost. The process of
rebooting incurs a similar loss of state. When the machine is resumed, the hardware and
processor state are restored from a resume image. Forenscope does not have the luxury to
save any state before the reboot and instead must fabricate an analogous restore state by
scanning for clues in the residual memory image.
In this section, we describe the process of resuscitating the core hardware on a unipro-
cessor PC such as the keyboard, mouse, VGA graphics chip, interrupt controller, system
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timer and Ethernet chip. Most modern PCs have core hardware that is similar and back-
wards compatible with older revisions [43]. We describe restoration support for basic pe-
ripherals; this configuration is generally sufficient for system recovery. Each hardware
device has its own peculiarities, and the recovery process is tailored to device semantics.
We detail specific restoration challenges on a case-by-case basis.
Interrupt Controller:
X86 PCs use an i8259-compatible interrupt controller. This controller is responsible for
arbitrating interrupts from various peripherals such as the keyboard, disk and network in-
terface to the CPU. The i8259 controller supports interrupt masking and prioritization. On
a PC, the highest priority interrupt is the system timer, followed by the keyboard. Other
peripherals are usually assigned a dynamic interrupt number and priority by the PCI or
plug and play (PNP) controller.
Upon reboot, the system BIOS completely resets the i8259 controller. All interrupts are
masked and disabled. During recovery, we re-enable interrupts of active devices upon re-
suscitation. The i8259 also supports interrupt renumbering, which allows the controller to
shift interrupt numbers by a base offset. Linux uses this facility to remap i8259 interrupts
number 0-7 to Linux interrupts 32-39. Linux combines interrupts and processor exceptions
(such as page faults) into a common linear exception table for fast lookup. Forenscope must
restore this offset; otherwise Linux misinterprets the interrupt number read from the con-
troller as a different processor interrupt, and causes a kernel panic by running the incorrect
handler.
Some modern computers, especially those with multiple processors, use a newer in-
terrupt controller called the Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller (APIC). This
controller is backward compatible with the i8259, and its semantics are similar. The code
for resuscitating an APIC on a uniprocessor machine is similar to that of an i8259. At this
time, we do not support multiprocessor machines.
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System timer:
PCs have three i8253 programmable interrupt timers (PIT). Each timer can be configured
for periodic or one-shot interrupts in accordance to a countdown value. The Linux kernel
only uses the first timer as the system timer. The default setting for Linux is to configure
a 100 Hz timer to periodically activate the scheduler. The other two timers are used by
various drivers and applications.
Upon reboot, these timers are left intact. We do not need to reinitialize any of them.
Although these timers do not need to be restored, their semantics are inconsistent when the
system is resuscitated. For example, the system timer interrupt is not received by the kernel
for the duration of the reboot, and hence the Linux jiffies software timer is suspended.
Therefore, system time lags behind wall clock time. In order to preserve the semantics of
software that relies on the correct time, we restore the system’s time by reading the wall
clock time from the hardware clock, which is always running (powered by a battery) even
when the computer is turned off.
Starting with the Pentium, newer X86 processors include a monotonically increasing
64-bit CPU cycle time-stamp counter that is reset to zero whenever the processor is reset.
The value of this counter can be read using the rdtsc instruction. Since this counter will
be reset when the system is rebooted, code watching this counter for unexpected changes
may be able to detect a discrepancy. In order to avoid detection, we estimate the value of
the counter based on the system uptime and write this calculated value back to the counter
using the wrmsr instruction.
PS/2 Keyboard/Mouse:
PS/2 keyboards and mice are driven by an i8042 controller. This controller is responsible
for receiving keystrokes, mouse movements, and mouse clicks as well as setting keyboard
LEDs. The controller itself is reinitialized by the BIOS at boot time. When GRUB runs,
it initializes the controller and since Linux uses the same keyboard settings, no special
re-initialization is required.
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By default, the mouse is disabled by the BIOS at boot time. Forenscope sends the i8042
controller a command to re-enable the mouse port. Some PS/2 mice have settings for the
scroll wheel and extra buttons. These settings are reinitialized by Forenscope to conform
to the protocol of a standard scroll wheel mouse. Custom mouse protocols and advanced
settings are vendor-dependent, and are thus not restored.
Display:
Although there are a myriad of video chips and drivers in the market, most chipsets support
the standard VGA and VESA video modes. In Linux, the X server provides the graphics
console and directly controls the hardware. When Forenscope reinitializes the device, it
sets the video chip back to a safe state in text mode. Once the system is revived, the
investigator can manually switch back to the X graphics console. The X server will perform
the necessary re-initialization of the video device when switching back to the graphics
mode.
Disk:
The IDE controller connects peripherals such as hard drives and optical disks to the system.
Upon reboot, the BIOS reinitializes the disks and disables their corresponding interrupts
on the i8259.
Forenscope eschews re-initialization of the disk controller, and instead relies on Linux’s
error recovery routines. IDE drives are accessed using a request/response command inter-
face. If any command fails to respond due to disk or bus communication errors, Linux
will retry the command or reinitialize the disk controller. This facility is used to deal with
buggy IDE controllers and disks, which may hang under certain errant conditions.
When a disk is first accessed after Forenscope is run, there is an initial three-second lag
while the initial IDE command times out and Linux resets the controller. Linux reports this
disk error as a lost IDE interrupt, and transparently retries the command. Since the access
is successful upon retry, no data read errors are reported, and the disk continues to operate
smoothly without error.
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Coprocessor units:
The Intel architecture has support for various coprocessors that are directly attached to
the main CPU. One of the most popular units is the i387-compatible math coprocessor or
floating-point unit (FPU). Since this coprocessor has become a fundamental part of the
architecture, the kernel and user space C libraries expect it to be present and functional.
Whenever the kernel performs a context switch, it saves the current process’s FPU state
and restores the FPU state of the process to be switched in. The user space GNU C library
also initializes the floating-point unit during C program startup to ensure a predictable FPU
state for C programs.
Upon reboot, the FPU is disabled by the system firmware. Forenscope must reset the
FPU and re-enable it in order to clear any pending exceptions. Otherwise, the kernel’s
context switch code will fail when it suddenly discovers that the floating-point unit is off,
and the FPU state cannot be saved or restored. The user space FPU settings are restored by
the kernel’s context switch code, so that applications do not mysteriously fail.
Network:
Upon reboot, the BIOS probes network devices and runs each device’s respective firmware.
This supports functionality such as network booting. We have found that many network
chips are non-functional after resuscitation, so we must perform some re-initialization.
Luckily, the Linux network driver model allows Ethernet devices to specify a transmit
timeout function. This functionality allows a network interface to run a recovery routine if
a transmission is held up in the send buffer, and does not get sent within a requisite timeout
period. As part of the resuscitation process, Forenscope uses the Linux network device
API to iterate through all network interfaces and calls each transmit timeout function. In
many cases, this primes the network chip, and restores functionality. Since this API is
part of the kernel’s generic network device interface API, it does not depend on the card
vendor, so many chipsets are supported without additional effort. We have confirmed that
this approach works with the Intel PRO/100 and Intel PRO/1000 Ethernet adapters.
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Typically, an Ethernet chip contains send and receive buffers. These buffers act as hold-
ing areas to queue outgoing packets when the Ethernet line is busy, and receive buffers to
temporarily store unprocessed packets. Although Forenscope is able to recover the func-
tionality of the Ethernet interface, there is the issue of packet loss while the computer is
rebooting. These transient faults are always handled at higher network layers such as TCP
and network connections do not usually experience any adverse affects. Since the reboot
process requires less than half a minute, applications do not time out and subsequently
close their connections.
5.5.1 Dealing with Diverse Hardware Configurations
Forenscope scans the PCI bus to determine the list of devices in the system. For each
device, Forenscope checks to see if there is a specialized recovery routine for the device.
If so, Forenscope executes the proper code to revive the hardware device.
If a specialized hardware recovery routine is not available, Forenscope calls the kernel’s
default recovery routine for the device. For instance, the network and hard drive device
drivers both include timeout recovery routines in the event that the hardware fails to respond
within a specified timeout.
In some cases, full recovery of the machine to the point where the graphical interface is
restored is not necessary. Since restoring graphics may be non-trivial with certain chipsets,
it may be a better strategy to simply obtain a command shell for analysis. With the shell, the
investigator can change the user’s password temporarily for the session (using the software
write blocker to make the changes non-persistent) and login remotely to access the user’s
desktop environment. Furthermore, many kinds of analysis can be performed through the
command-line and process-level memory dumps can also offer a wealth of helpful infor-
mation.
54
Chapter 6
Modules
We have developed a number of modules to aid in forensic analysis. The modules are run
in the order depicted in Figure 6.1. These modules run in groups where stage 1 modules
run in the golden state to collect pristine information while stage 2 modules rely on OS
services to provide a shell and block disk writes. Finally, stage 3 resumes the original
operating environment.
Scribe:
Scribe collects basic investigation information such as the time, date, list of PCI devices,
processor serial number and other hardware features. These details are stored along with
the evidence collected by other modules to identify the source of a snapshot.
Cloner:
Cloner is a memory dump forensic tool that is able to capture a high-fidelity image of
volatile memory contents to a trusted device. Existing techniques for creating physical
memory dumps are limited by their reliance on system resources that are vulnerable to
deception. Cloner works around forensic blurriness issues and rootkit cloaking by running
in stage 1 before control is returned to the original host OS. In the golden state, the system
uses protected mode to access memory directly through Forenscope’s safe memory
space. Using this technique, Cloner accesses memory directly without relying on services
from the incumbent operating system or its page tables. To dump the contents of memory,
Cloner writes to disk using BIOS calls instead of using an OS disk driver. This channel
avoids a potentially booby-trapped or corrupted operating system disk driver and ensures
that the written data has better forensic integrity. Most BIOS firmware supports read/write
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Figure 6.1: Forenscope modules
access to USB flash drives and hard disks. Another reason to use the BIOS for dumping is
that it minimizes the memory footprint of Forenscope and reduces dependencies on drivers
for various USB and SATA chipsets. Once Cloner captures a clean memory dump, the
investigator can run other modules or tools that may alter the contents of memory without
worry of tainting the evidence.
Memory dumps can be analyzed using offline tools such as Volatility [23] to find bits
of residual evidence that may exist in the image. The encouraging results of Chapter 3 sug-
gest that advances in forensic analysis techniques may one day help to uncover previously
unreadable information.
Informant:
Informant checks for suspicious signs in the system that may indicate tampering by identi-
fying the presence of alterations caused by malware. In order to extract clean copies of the
program code and static structures such as the system call table, Forenscope must have ac-
cess to a copy of the vmlinux kernel file that is scanned to locate global kernel variables
and the location of various functions. Most Linux distributions provide this information.
Read-only program code and data structures are checked against this information to ensure
that they have not been altered or misconfigured. Such alterations have the potential to
hinder the investigation process and Informant helps to assess the integrity of a machine
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Figure 6.2: File system architecture
before further analysis is attempted. After Informant verifies the system, it also records
other useful information such as the contents of the kernel dmesg log, kernel version, run-
ning processes, open files and open network sockets. This information can help expedite
the investigation process by capturing a part of the system’s dynamic state.
Neutralizer:
Neutralizer inoculates the system of anti-forensic software by detecting and repairing al-
terations in binary code and key system data structures such as the system call table. These
structures can be repaired by restoring them with clean copies extracted from the original
sources. Since many rootkits rely on alteration techniques, Neutralizer can recover from the
effects of common forms of corruption. Presently, Neutralizer is unable to recover from
corruption or alteration of dynamic data structures. Neutralizer also suppresses certain
security services such as the screensaver, keyboard lock and potential malware or anti-
forensic tools by terminating them. To terminate processes, neutralizer sends a SIGKILL
signal instead of a SIGTERM signal so that there is no opportunity to ignore the signal.
Customized signals can be sent to each target process. For some system services that
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respawn, terminating them is ineffective, so forcefully changing the process state to zom-
bie (Z) or uninterruptible disk sleep (D) is desired instead of killing the application directly.
An alternative would be to send the SIGSEGV signal to certain applications to mimic the
effects of a crash. Neutralizer selects processes to kill based on the analysis mode. For
incident response on server machines, a white list approach is used to terminate processes
that do not belong to the set of core services. This policy prevents running unauthorized
applications that may cause harm to the system. For investigation, Neutralizer takes a black
list approach and kills off known malicious processes. Information to populate this black-
list can be found by consulting known malware databases that record the name and hash
of known rootkits and bots. For certain domains such as industrial control and critical in-
frastructure, the whitelist of applications can be populated by listing only critical control
processes and loggers. This approach has been shown to be fairly effective for embedded
controllers running commodity operating systems.
ForenShell:
ForenShell is a special superuser bash shell that allows interactive exploration of a system
by using standard tools. When coupled with BitBlocker(below), ForenShell provides a safe
environment to perform customized live analyses. In this mode, ForenShell becomes non-
persistent and it does not taint the contents of storage devices. Once ForenShell is started,
traditional tools such as Tripwire or Encase may be run directly for further analysis.
Forenscope launches the superuser shell on a virtual console by directly spawning it
from a privileged kernel thread. ForenShell runs as the last analysis module after Informant
and Neutralizer have been executed. At this point, the system has already been scanned for
malware and anti-forensic software. If Neutralizer is unable to clean an infection, it dis-
plays a message informing the investigator that the output of ForenShell may be unreliable
due to possible system corruption.
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BitBlocker:
BitBlocker is a software-based write blocker that inhibits writing to storage devices to
avoid tainting the contents of persistent media. Since actions performed by ForenShell
during exploration can inadvertently leave undesired tracks, BitBlocker helps to provide
a safe non-persistent analysis environment that emulates disk writes without physically
altering the contents of the media.
Simply re-mounting a disk in read-only mode to prevent writing may cause some ap-
plications to fail because they may need to create temporary files and expect open files to
remain writable. Typically, when an application creates or writes files, the changes are not
immediately flushed to disk and they are held in the disk’s buffer cache until the system can
flush the changes. The buffer cache manages intermediate disk operations and services sub-
sequent read requests with pending writes from the disk buffer when possible. BitBlocker
mimics the expected file semantics of the original system by reconfiguring the kernel’s disk
buffer cache layer to hold all writes instead of flushing them to disk. This approach works
on any type of file system because it operates directly on the disk buffer that is one layer
below the file system. BitBlocker’s design is similar to that of some Linux-based RAM
disk systems [44] which cleverly use the disk buffer as a storage system by configuring
the storage device with a null backing store instead of using a physical disk. Each time a
disk write is issued, barring a sync operation, the operating system’s disk buffer subsys-
tem holds the request in the buffer until a certain write threshold or timeout is reached. In
Linux, a system daemon called pdflush handles flushing buffered writes to disk. To prevent
flushing to the disk, BitBlocker reconfigures the write threshold of the disk to inhibit buffer
flushing, disables pdflush and hooks the sync, sync file range, fsync, bdflush and umount
system calls with a write monitor wrapper. Figure 6.2 shows the architectural diagram
of the Linux filesystem layer and where BitBlocker intercepts disk write operations. Al-
though BitBlocker inserts hooks into the operating system, it does not interfere with the
operations of Informant and Neutralizer because those modules are run before BitBlocker
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and they operate on a clean copy of memory. The hooks and techniques used by BitBlocker
are common to Linux 2.6.x kernels and they are robust to changes in the kernel version.
Similar techniques should be possible with other operating systems.
NetLogger
Since the contents of network connections established through encrypted tunnels such as
VPNs and IPSEC cannot be directly analyzed on the physical wiring, it is challenging to
get a good packet trace of such traffic using conventional tools. NetLogger relies on host
tools such as TCPdump or Ethereal to generate plaintext traces of sessions originating from
the host. This can be helpful if the machine being analyzed is a VPN concentrator or router
that manages many connections to the internal network.
Reincarnator:
Reincarnator restores a memory dump to a physical system. Instead of relying on memory
remanence, Reincarnator reads a raw memory dump from a storage device back to memory
and then runs Forenscope’s state reconstruction algorithm to resuscitate the system. This
module should be used with care since it assumes that the underlying system state has
not changed. For instance, if a memory dump is taken with Cloner and restored with
Reincarnator, the contents of the underlying disk should match the contents at the time of
state capture.
A forensic investigator can use this module as follows. First, the investigator acquires a
consistent memory dump using Cloner. Then, the original hard disk is copied for forensic
soundness. Once a copy is made, the investigator can then install the cloned disk into the
original machine and run Reincarnator to restore the machine. Care should be taken to
ensure that the replacement disk has the exact configuration as the original disk; otherwise
corruption may occur due to using a different hardware driver or due to variations in the
low-level disk block layout.
If the machine is using standard IDE drivers and a generic set of drivers (PC-compatible),
then it may be possible to restore to a virtual machine. We have tested this to a limited ca-
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pacity in QEMU and the results seem promising. This suggests that error recovery facilities
in operating systems are robust enough to support advanced recovery even if the hardware
is completely reset or reinitialized.
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Chapter 7
Results and Evaluation
We evaluate Forenscope against the requirements of a good forensic tool and measure five
characteristics: correctness, performance, downtime, fidelity and effectiveness against mal-
ware.
7.1 Hardware and Software Setup
To demonstrate functionality, we tested and evaluated the performance of Forenscope on
two machines: a SEL-1102 industrial computer and an IBM Intellistation M Pro. The SEL-
1102 used in our experiments is a rugged computer designed for power system substation
use and it is equipped with 512 MB of DRAM and a 4 GB compact flash card mounted in
the first drive slot as the system disk. The SEL-1102 can operate in temperatures ranging
from -40 to +75 degrees Celsius. The IBM Intellistation M Pro is a standard desktop work-
station equipped with 1 GB of DRAM. For some tests, we opted to use a QEMU-based
virtual machine system to precisely measure timing and taint. Forenscope and the modules
that we developed were tested on the Linux 2.6 kernel. Although Forenscope was origi-
nally built to target Linux, we plan to expand this work to other systems.
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7.2 Correctness
We tested Forenscope against a mix of applications to show that a wide range of hardware,
software and network applications are compatible. Correctness is assessed by comparing
the output of several applications in a control environment against corresponding output in
a test environment. Effectiveness against security programs is demonstrated by bypassing
several encryption utilities. In each case, Forenscope is able to recover the operating state
of the system without breaking the semantics of running applications.
Please note that the actual encryption algorithms are not understood by Forenscope, and
that the security mechanism bypassed here is the screensaver or console lock. These tests
merely demonstrate that the security applications are not sensitive to a mediated reboot.
To confirm that Forenscope is able to correctly resuscitate the system without corrupt-
ing memory or the processor cache, we run a standard memory tester called memtester [45],
and reboot the machine during several test runs. The tests we selected create patterns in
two separate memory areas by either writing random values or performing some simple
computations such as multiplication or division. It then compares the two areas to ensure
that no memory errors have occurred. We ran over 10 trials of these tests on our evaluation
system while restarting the system in the middle of the test. In all of these cases, memtester
does not report any errors.
In order to verify the correctness of the system after resuscitation, we force a restart in
the middle of several different tasks and examine if the tasks complete correctly after the
resuscitation.
The tasks performed are:
1. gcc: Compilation of the C source file containing the H.264/MPEG-4 AVC video com-
pression codec in the MPlayer [46] media program.
2. gzip: File compression using the deflate compression algorithm.
3. wget: File download.
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4. convert: JPEG image encoding.
5. aespipe: AES file encryption.
For the last four tasks, we use a 100 MB TIFF image file as the input. For each task, we
compare MD5 hashes of the output file generated without a Forenscope interruption against
results obtained from a test with a restart in the middle of task execution. We have run each
experiment at least 10 times and have not encountered any errors.
The primary goal of Forenscope is to provide the investigator with access to protected
data on a live system transparently. In order to demonstrate that this goal has been attained,
we selectively test several applications and kernel-level subsystems that provide secure
access to data and network resources. All of these programs store temporary keys in volatile
memory.
The applications we test are:
1. SSH secure shell connection between the target and another host.
2. SSL web browser session to a secure web server.
3. PPTP [47] VPN connection to a secure university network.
4. dm-crypt [48] encrypted file system.
5. Loop-AES [49] encrypted file system.
In the first two cases, the secret keys are located in user space. In the remaining cases, the
keys are stored in kernel memory. We perform each test on a machine that is locked by a
user (using a console locking program) with these programs running in the background. In
each case, the Neutralizer module was used to terminate the lock program after resuscita-
tion.
Our SSH tests use OpenSSH version 4.6 as the client and server. OpenSSH supports
various modes of the AES, DES, Blowfish and ARC4 ciphers. In each case, Forenscope
was able to allow an investigator to access the secure shell irrespective of the underlying
encryption scheme or key size that was used. The SSL test consists of a web browser ses-
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sion connected to a popular web e-mail service using TLS 1.0 and AES encryption. After
restarting, we were still able to browse mail folders, read messages, and send e-mail using
the seized session. The VPN client we used was based on the Point-to-Point Tunneling Pro-
tocol (PPTP) [47] with 128 bit keys. VPN connections and application sessions remained
operable after a successful run, and new connections could be established over the open
tunnel. This implies that enterprise level perimeter defenses can be successfully overcome
using Forenscope. We also tested Forenscope against two popular Linux file system en-
cryption systems: dm-crypt and Loop-AES. Both systems were configured to use 256-bit
AES CBC encryption. We were able to access the contents of the file system successfully.
These experiments demonstrate the significance of our approach. Other published key
retrieval techniques [35, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54] must be tailored to specific key types, sizes, ap-
plications or kernel components. Such techniques require extra support to use the retrieved
keys to gain access to secure sessions. Forenscope allows the investigator to access the live
system and immediately explore or manipulate protected data.
To evaluate the correctness of BitBlocker, we ran it on the IBM and on a QEMU system
emulator. Using the emulator allowed us to verify integrity by checksumming the contents
of the virtual disk. Our test cases include using the dd utility to fill up the disk, then issuing
a sync command and unmounting the disk. Other cases tested include copying large files
and compiling large programs consisting of hundreds of files. In each case, BitBlocker
worked correctly and no writes were issued to the physical disk. After the test completed,
we confirmed that the contents of the disk were unchanged by comparing hashes of the
contents against the original contents.
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Figure 7.1: BitBlocker memory usage
7.3 Performance
Forenscope loads and revives the operating system within seconds. An interesting side ef-
fect is that BitBlocker makes disk operations appear to be faster because no data is flushed
to the physical disk from the disk buffer. A write of a 128 MB file took 32.78 s without
BitBlocker and 3.71 s with BitBlocker. The number of dirty disk buffers consumed in-
creases proportionately with the size of the files written. Since BitBlocker inhibits flushing
to disk, running out of file buffers can create a condition where the filesystem fills up and
reports a write error. To measure these effects on the system, we collected buffer cache us-
age information once a second in several key applications: creating a compressed archive
with tar-bzip2, downloading a file using wget and compiling the software package busy-
box. Figure 7.1 shows the utilization of dirty file buffers over time for the tar-gzip case.
Wget and busybox compilation have similar results. In the graphs, we report statistics from
/proc/meminfo such as cached, dirty and free. According to the documentation
for /proc, cached in Linux represents the amount of data in the page cache which in-
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Table 7.1: Linux memory measurements (borrowed from the /proc man page)
Quantity Description
MemFree The amount of physical RAM, in kilobytes, left unused by the system
Buffers The amount of physical RAM, in kilobytes, used for file buffers
Cached The amount of physical RAM, in kilobytes, used as cache memory
Active The total amount of buffer or page cache memory, in kilobytes, that
is in active use. This is memory that has been recently used and is
usually not reclaimed for other purposes
Dirty The total amount of memory, in kilobytes, waiting to be written back
to the disk
Writeback The total amount of memory, in kilobytes, actively being written back
to the disk
cludes cached data from read-only files as well as write buffers. Dirty represents items
that need to be committed to the disk and free represents free memory. Table 7.1 summa-
rizes these measurements.
From our observations, dirty is generally very low in the normal case because the
kernel commits write buffers periodically. However, in BitBlocker, dirty grows steadily
because the data cannot be committed back to the disk. To estimate the amount of memory
required to run BitBlocker, our experiments show that in many scenarios, even 128 MB of
free memory is sufficient for BitBlocker to operate. Our experiments show that BitBlocker
is robust even when the system runs low in memory. At 200 seconds, the physical memory
of the machine fills up and the tar-bz2 process stops because the disk is ”full.” The system
does not crash and other apps continue to run as long as they do not write to the disk. On a
typical system with 2 GB of memory, BitBlocker should be able to maintain disk writabil-
ity for a much longer period of time.
Downtime:
As discussed earlier, one important metric for evaluating a forensic tool is the amount of
downtime incurred during use. To show that Forenscope minimally disrupts the operation
of systems, we measured the amount of time required to activate the system. Forenscope
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Table 7.2: Forenscope execution times
Task Time (s)
Forced reboot on SEL-1102 15.1
Forced reboot on IBM Intellistation 9.8
Watchdog on SEL-1102 15.2
executed in 15.1 s using the reboot method on the SEL-1102 and in 9.8 s on the IBM
Intellistation while the watchdog method took 15.2 s to execute on the SEL-1102. Table
7.2 summarizes these results. The majority of the downtime is due to the BIOS boot up
sequence and this downtime can be reduced on some machines. Many network protocols
and systems can handle this brief interruption gracefully without causing significant prob-
lems. We tested this functionality by verifying that VPN, SSH and web browser sessions
continue to work without timing out despite the interruption. Many of these protocols have
a timeout tolerance that is sufficiently long to avoid disconnections while Forenscope is
operating and TCP is designed to retransmit lost packets during this short interruption.
To measure the disruption to network applications caused by running Forenscope con-
tinuously over a period of time, we ran a test designed to mimic the brief reboot cycle used
by the analysis process. The test measures the instantaneous speed of an HTTP file transfer
between a server and a client machine. While the file transfer is in session, we period-
ically interrupt the transfer by forcibly restarting the machine and subsequently reviving
it using Forenscope. Each time the system is interrupted, the server process is suspended
while the machine reboots. The process is then resumed once Forenscope is done running.
As a baseline, we created a control experiment where the server process is periodically
suspended and resumed by a shell script acting as a governor to limit the rate at which
the server operates. This script sends the SIGSTOP signal to suspend the server process,
waits a few seconds to emulate the time required for the boot up process and then sends a
SIGCONT signal to resume operation. In each experiment, a curl client fetches a 1 MB
file from a thttpd server at a rate of 10 KB/s. We chose these parameters to illustrate
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Figure 7.2: HTTP data transfer rate comparison
how a streaming application or low-bandwidth application such as a logger may behave.
During this download process, the server was rebooted once every 20 seconds and we mea-
sured the instantaneous bandwidth with a boot up delay of 5 and 10 seconds to observe the
effects of various boot up times. We observed that the bandwidth drops to zero while the
system boots and the download resumes promptly after the reboot. No TCP connections
were broken during the experiment and the checksum of the downloaded file matched that
of the original file on the server. A graph of the instantaneous bandwidth vs. time is plot-
ted in Figure 7.2. We compared the results of our test against the control experiment and
observed that the behavior was very similar. Thus we believe that running Forenscope can
be considered as safe as suspending and resuming the process. During the experiment we
noticed that the bandwidth spiked immediately after the machine recovered and attribute
this behavior to the internal 2-second periodic timer used by thttpd to adjust the rate limit-
ing throttle table.
69
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
%
 o
f c
ha
ng
ed
 p
ag
es
Time (in seconds)
firefox
ubuntu-idle
vista-idle
dd
tar-gzip
Figure 7.3: Comparison of memory blurriness
7.4 Taint and Blurriness
We evaluated the taint in a snapshot saved by Forenscope using a snapshot captured by dd
as the baseline. In an experimental setup running with 128 MB of memory, we collected
an accurate snapshot St of the physical memory using QEMU and compared that with a
snapshot Sˆv obtained from each forensic tool. The number of altered pages for each of
the configurations is presented in Table 7.3. We observe that since Forenscope is loaded in
conventional memory, the only pages that differ are found in the lower 640 KB of mem-
ory. Our experiments show that Forenscope is far better than dd because no difference was
observed in the extended memory between the snapshot taken by Forenscope and the base-
line snapshot. It should be noted that as the machine is suspended in the golden state when
running Forenscope, there is no blurriness associated with the snapshot taken by Foren-
scope. For dd, we measured the taint when using a file system mounted with and without
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the sync option. The number of pages affected remains almost the same in both cases and
we observed that the majority of second-order taint was due to the operating system filling
the page-cache buffer while writing the snapshot. To evaluate how much taint was induced
due to buffering, we ran experiments in which dd was configured to write directly to disk,
skipping any page-cache buffers by using the O DIRECT open() flag. The results show that
the taint was much lower than the earlier experiment, but still greater than the taint caused
by using Forenscope. In order to estimate the amount of blurriness caused when tools like
dd are used, we measured the natural drift over time of some typical configurations. We
collected and compared memory dumps of systems running Ubuntu 8.04 with 512 MB
of memory in a virtual machine environment hosted in QEMU. In each case, we snapshot
the physical memory of the virtual machine and calculate the number of pages that differ
from the initial image over a period of time. The snapshots were sampled using a tilted
time frame to capture the steady state behavior of the system in an attempt to measure δv.
The samples were taken at 10-second intervals for the first five minutes and at 1-minute
intervals for the next two hours. From Figure 7.3, we observe that the drift remains nearly
constant after a short period of time for our experimental setup and for the idle Ubuntu
and Vista systems, the drift stabilizes within a few minutes. The drift for a system running
Mozilla Firefox was found to be nearly constant within 10 minutes. Running tar and gzip
for compressing a large folder or dd to dump the contents of memory into a file resulted
in most of the memory being changed within a minute due to second-order taint. To sum-
marize, our tests demonstrated that there is no taint introduced in the extended memory by
using Forenscope and that Forenscope can be used for forensic analysis where taint needs
to be minimized. Forenscope compresses data to maximize the efficiency of capturing a
memory image. Common compression tools, such as gzip or bzip2, require more code and
scratch memory than there is available within the allotted 640 KB of conventional memory.
We use a lightweight library called quicklz because it resides in 2.4 KB of code, uses 46
KB of memory for scratch space, and provides average compression ratios around 47.5%.
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Description Pages changed in Con-
ventional Memory
Pages changed in Extended
Memory
(Total of 32768 pages)
Forenscope 41 (0.125%) 0(0%)
dd 0 (0%) 7100 (21.66%)
dd to FS mounted with sync flag 0 (0%) 7027 (21.44%)
dd with O DIRECT 0 (0%) 480 (1.46%)
Table 7.3: Taint measurement
7.5 Trusted Baseline
We compared the output of Forenscope’s process list against that reported by ps on a pris-
tine system and found that the results agreed with the control experiment. Similar exper-
iments were performed against the output of netstat, and lsof that lists open files on the
system. Memory dumps were tested by performing a dump of memory from /dev/mem
and comparing against a Forenscope memory dump when the system was idle. Due to the
issue of forensic blurriness, there were some artifacts that were reported differently be-
tween the memory dumps, but special markers we inserted into the memory were correctly
identified along with crucial portions of the kernel. To further demonstrate correctness, we
performed a memory dump with the QEMU emulator and compared it against the dump
taken by Forenscope. The memory images matched with the exception of the interrupt
stack because QEMU was able to halt the machine during the dump phase but the process
of running Forenscope triggered the execution of sysrq handling code. Therefore, we are
confident that our tool is no worse than existing dumpers, and operationally no worse than
a baseline memory dump from an emulator.
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7.6 Effectiveness Against Anti-forensic Tools
Although forensics techniques can collect significant amounts of information, investiga-
tors must be careful to ensure the veracity and fidelity of the evidence collected because
anti-forensic techniques can hide or intentionally obfuscate information gathered. In par-
ticular, rootkits can be used by hackers to hide the presence of malicious software such as
bots running in the system. Malware tools such as the FU rootkit[55] directly manipulate
kernel objects and corrupt process lists in ways that many conventional tools cannot de-
tect. Malware researchers have also demonstrated techniques to evade traditional memory
analysis through the use of low-level rootkits[56] which cloak themselves by deceiving OS-
based memory acquisition channels on Linux and Windows. Hardware [57] and software
[58] virtualization-based rootkits may be challenging to detect or remove by the legitimate
operating system or application software because they operate one layer below standard
anti-malware facilities. We describe and evaluate how Forenscope reacts to several pub-
licly available rootkits. The set of rootkits was chosen to cover a representative gamut
of kernel-level threats, but the list is not meant to be exhaustive due to space constraints.
These rootkits in particular subvert function pointers and reachable data. Some rootkits
burrow themselves very deep into the kernel and modify non-trivial data structures. To
detect these rootkits, an object mapping can be created using a tool such as KOP[59] to
identify malicious alterations.
DR:
The DR rootkit uses processor-level hardware debug facilities to intercept system calls
rather than modifying the actual system call table itself. DR reprograms a hardware break-
point that is reached every time a system call is made[60]. The breakpoint then intercepts
the call and runs its own handler before passing control to the legitimate system call han-
dler. Since Forenscope does not restore the state of debug registers, DR is effectively
neutralized across the reboot, and as a result, hidden processes are revealed. Informant
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detects DR in several ways: DR is present in the module list, DR symbols are exported
to the kernel and DR debug strings are present in memory. If an attacker modifies DR to
make it stealthier by removing these indicators, we contend that it is still hard to deceive
Forenscope, since the debug registers are cleared as part of the reboot process. Although
Forenscope doesn’t restore the contents of the debug registers faithfully, this doesn’t pose a
problem for most normal applications because generally only debuggers use this function-
ality.
Phalanx B6:
Table 7.4: Effectiveness against rootkit threats
Rootkit Description Sanitization action
DR Uses debug registers to hook system calls Rebooting clears debug regis-
ters
Phalanx b6 Uses /dev/kmem to hook syscalls Restore clean syscall table
Mood-NT Multi-module RK using /dev/kmem/ Clear debug regs, restore
pointers
Adore Kernel module hooks /proc VFS layer Restore original VFS pointers
Phalanx hijacks the system call table by directly writing to memory via the /dev/mem mem-
ory device instead of using a kernel module. It works by scanning the internal symbol table
of the kernel and redirecting control flow to its own internal functions. Informant detects
Phalanx while checking the system call table and common kernel pointers. Neutralizer
restores the correct pointers to inoculate the system of Phalanx.
Adore:
Adore [61] is a classic rootkit which hijacks kernel pointers to deceive tools such as ps
and netstat. It works by overwriting pointers in the /proc filesystem to redirect control
flow to its own functions rather than modifying the syscall table directly. Informant detects
that the pointers used by Adore do not belong to the original read-only program code seg-
ment of the kernel and Neutralizer restores the correct pointers. Restoration of the original
pointers is simple and safe because the overwritten VFS function operations tables point to
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static functions such as proc readdir, while Adore has custom handlers located in untrusted
writable kernel module address space.
Mood-NT:
Mood-NT is a versatile multi-mode rootkit that can hook the system call table, use debug
registers and modify kernel pointers. Because of its versatility, the attacker can customize
it for different purposes. Like the rootkits described previously, Forenscope detects Mood-
NT in various modes. Our experiments indicate that Mood-NT hooks 44 system calls and
Forenscope detects all of these alterations. Furthermore, each hook points out of the ker-
nel’s read-only program code address space and into the untrusted memory area occupied
by the rootkit.
7.7 Size
Forenscope is written in a mixture of C and X86 assembly code. Table 7.5 shows that
Forenscope is a very small program. It consumes less than 48 KB in code and 125 KB
in running memory footprint. The lines of code reported in the table are from the output
of the sloccount program. We break down the size of each component into core C and
assembly code, hardware-specific restoration code and module code. To minimize its size,
Forenscope reuses existing kernel code to reinitialize the disk and network; the size of this
kernel code is device-specific and therefore excluded from the table, since these compo-
nents are not part of Forenscope. The small compiled size of Forenscope and its modules
implies that a minimal amount of host memory is overwritten when Forenscope is loaded
onto the system. Furthermore, the diminutive size of the code base makes it more suitable
for auditing and verification.
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Table 7.5: Sizes of Forenscope and modules
Component Lines of Code Compiled Size
(Bytes)
Forenscope (C) 1690 15,420
Forenscope (Assembly) 171 327
Forenscope (Hardware) 280 1,441
Neutralizer & ForenShell 34 8,573
Other Modules 861 22,457
Total 3,036 48,218
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Chapter 8
Discussion
Live and volatile forensics techniques are still nascent in many ways. To make forward
progress, there needs to be advancements made on four fronts. First, the legal community
should come up with more precise definitions and standards regarding the collection of
volatile evidence and its admissibility in court. Second, better capture techniques need to
be developed to collect a higher fidelity snapshot of the original evidence. Third, evidence
collection tools need to improve by being less intrusive and more complete. Finally, with
these developments in place, analysis tools need to better identify interesting evidence and
help the investigator reconstruct the “forensic timeline.” This discussion section will touch
upon some of the issues that need to be solved to realize these goals.
8.1 Legal Standards
Legally, the jury is still out on the use of live forensic tools because of the issues of taint
and blurriness. While some recent cases [12] suggest that courts are starting to recognize
the value of the contents of volatile memory, the validity of the evidence is still being con-
tested. A recent manual on collecting evidence in criminal investigations released by the
Department of Justice [62], instructs that no limitations should be placed on the forensic
techniques that may be used to search and also states that use of forensic software, no
matter how sophisticated, does not affect constitutional requirements. Although we do not
make strict claims of legal validity in the courts, we are encouraged by the above guide-
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lines to collect as much volatile information as possible. We objectively compare our tool
against the state of the art and find that it does collect more forms of evidence with better
fidelity than existing tools.
8.2 Acquisition Methods and Non-intrusive Capture
Current proposals to acquire forensic evidence fall into two broad categories: hardware and
software-based tools. Generally speaking, in most cases including criminal investigation
and incident response, hardware tools must be installed a priori. PCI acquisition cards such
as CoPilot [63] need to be present on the system at the time of acquisition. Other forms
of acquisition over Firewire [64] can be performed on a running machine if the proper
prerequisites are met. These tools are generally limited by blurriness if they do not freeze a
system under acquisition. Likewise, since they all access memory through a PCI bus, they
are unable to inspect the contents of a CPU’s cache. With today’s large processor caches,
this lack of visibility may cause issues with the freshness and completeness of any evidence
collected.
In terms of software, the options are much less constrained. As discussed earlier, many
of these tools run on the host operating system and thus depend on the TCB of the run-
ning system. This can pose problems when the lower layers are not necessarily trustworthy
because of malware infections. Trustworthiness issues aside, these software solutions of-
ten induce taint by virtue of using operating system resources. Several variations of this
technique have been attempted including booting acquisition kernels [65] and combing hi-
bernation files [66]. While these variants allow for consistent high-fidelity snapshots to be
taken, they do have several limitations. First, the use of an acquisition kernel or system
crash dump is a one-way process. There is no way to recover the system from the induced
crash, so the system must be restarted after acquisition. This may limit further acquisition
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prospects after the initial system memory dump. Secondly, although combing the hiberna-
tion file may be a practical measure, the act of hibernating the machine notifies the running
software that the machine is about to go to sleep. This sleep signal can be caught by mal-
ware, encryption/privacy tools, VPNs and even applications. Modern software has a great
deal of leeway to clean up sensitive information well before the machine goes to sleep. On
the other hand, the hibernate file itself may be encrypted, which may present significant
challenges to such tools.
8.3 Identifying and Examining Evidence
The process of identifying and extracting evidence using volatile memory forensics tech-
niques is still nascent in many ways. Current techniques developed to extract evidence of
interest often rely on expert knowledge or some intuition about the structure of evidence.
These approaches have explored extracting ASCII data and data of high entropy. We be-
lieve that these approaches can be complemented by the use of statistical data to further
identify these structures. Cafegrind is a step in this direction because it helps to assess the
practicality of data extraction and automatically identify target types.
In the long term, we believe that the corpus of programs that need to be considered in a
forensic investigation can be quite large, and better systematic approaches to forensics are
necessary to address the natural diversity in software systems. In the process of doing so,
it is absolutely necessary to establish a ground truth as a baseline to measure evidence ex-
traction achievement against. Since many popular applications are written in loosely-typed
languages, it becomes necessary to adopt type-inferencing and type-discovery methods to
capture an accurate object map effectively.
Another trend that affects analysis is the use of modular components in software. For
instance, many applications embed web browsers, movie players and encryption algo-
rithms. Learning to recognize forensic evidence in one instance of a library is sufficient,
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because the same techniques can be equivalently applied to all other similar instances.
However, this level of sharing illustrates how complicated the software stack can be. In
the course of our analysis, we found that some applications such as web browsers link to
many shared libraries, and in some cases such as Konqueror, the original application binary
simply launches an instance of a shared web rendering framework called WebKit.
Furthermore, since libraries have strict function export interfaces and well-defined data
structures for interaction, crossing library boundaries can reveal a wealth of forensic infor-
mation. This is not surprising because these interfaces have been used as type-revealing
operations in type-sink systems[67]. Likewise, the use of these libraries often requires data
type conversion between different kinds of data structures and this results in duplication
of data. This duplication happens at the data structure level where the structures may be
shadowed in different libraries or in buffers where libraries pass information to each other.
For instance, a web browser might use libxml to parse an XML file, and then use libqt to
display it. An XML file parsed in this workflow would appear in the private data of both
libraries. Additionally, data can be buffered when it is being compressed or encrypted. The
original buffer contains a copy of the data as well as the compression/encryption library’s
temporary buffer. As a result, there are many copies of similar data present in memory and
our analysis is just the first step in shedding some light on the associations between these
structures.
Attribution is another important issue in this discussion. Some data structures found in
web browsers may not have been directly created as a direct consequence of user actions.
For instance, an advertisement served on a page may not have been knowingly requested
by the user and any forensic analysis should take the source of such evidence into account.
This effect is especially evident with Tor where anonymized network packets may be routed
through client nodes. Any forensic evidence collected from Tor should take into account the
source of the data with proper attribution. Some properties necessary for attribution include
proper factorization of functionality into units where each unit belongs to a principal and
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explicit control and data flow to track activities. Further research needs to be done to ensure
proper attribution of evidence.
In addition to attribution, logging and in-flight evidence collection are necessary to
acquire enough data points to create a forensic timeline. Approaches such as [68, 69]
provide trustworthy logging to aid the collection and preservation process. Once enough
points are collected and attributed, tools such as [70, 71] can be used to help generate
the forensic timeline automatically. Improved facilities to collect, attribute and correlate
these events would be highly desirable in next-generation operating systems and distributed
systems to support forensic activities.
8.4 Trustworthiness
While evaluating Forenscope, we observed different behavior of rootkits on virtual ma-
chines and physical hardware. Our observations confirm the results of Garfinkel et al [72]
that virtual machines cannot always emulate intricate hardware nuances faithfully and as
a result some malware fails to activate on a virtual machine. For example, malware such
as the Storm worm and Conficker[73] intentionally avoid activation when they sense the
presence of virtualization to thwart the analysis process. Hence analyzing a system for
rootkits using a virtual machine may not only cause some rootkits to slip under the radar
but also alert them to detection attempts. Since Forenscope continues to run the system
without exposing any of the issues raised by running virtualization systems, we argue that
the system is unlikely to tip off an attacker to the presence of forensic software. More
recently, some tools such as MAVMM[74] have been developed for the express purpose of
analyzing malware, but they must be installed a priori and they also require the presence of
virtualization hardware.
Although it is possible for attackers to falsify or fabricate information to impede the
examination process, a good forensic investigator will usually be able to detect an incon-
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sistency in the data. Locard’s principle of exchange suggests that it is very difficult for an
attacker to remove all traces of a crime. For instance, an attacker may alter system log
files in an attempt to hide their tracks, but they may forget to clear the SSH log file, shell
history, open network sockets, or latent volatile data structures in the kernel may suggest
that the system has been compromised. Detection of these inconsistencies using manual
approaches has been effective in practice and automating these practices using tools such
as [70, 71] can be promising.
Inconsistencies detected in various data sources can act as indications that certain ar-
tifacts collected may have a low level of trustworthiness. For instance, if an attacker has
gained user-level access to a machine, then files found in the user’s home folder may have
been altered. Alternatively, if a suspicious kernel module is found, little if any information
found on the machine may be trustworthy. Table 8.1 outlines various scenarios relating to
trust.
Alternatively, attackers may decide to target the forensic tools themselves to crash or
take control of them to falsify or hide information. This is not surprising since software
inherently has bugs and security vulnerabilities. Complicated code that parses data and
processes intricate data structures can be vulnerable to format string vulnerabilities, buffer
overflows and logic errors. Since Forenscope is relatively small at less than 5,000 lines of
code, it may be possible to formally verify the code base. To make the code base small,
Forenscope reuses large amounts of code from the bootloader, Grub, and also makes ex-
tensive use of BIOS calls. Formal analysis would also have to consider these dependencies
to ensure correctness and trustworthiness.
8.5 Countermeasures
Although Forenscope provides in-depth forensic analysis of a system in a wide variety of
scenarios, there are countermeasures that attackers and criminals can use to counter the
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Scenario Description
Compromised user account Files owned by the user may not be trustworthy
Root access acquired The attacker may have altered log files or reconfigured
the system. Logs and files may not be trustworthy.
Kernel level rootkit found Kernel level data structures are not trustworthy
Log files inconsistent The attacker may have altered a system logfile to cover
their tracks, but forgot to clean another (debug) logfile
Log files inconsistent with
shell history
The attacker may have altered a system logfile to cover
their tracks, but forgot to clear the shell history
/proc inconsistent with ps or
netstat
The attacker may have replaced system admin utilities
with trojan versions
Kernel data structures dis-
agree with ps or netstat
Attacker may have altered kernel data structures. Use
cross-view diff such as Strider-Ghostbuster to reveal
rootkit.
Table 8.1: Trustworthiness of evidence
use of Forenscope. From an incident response perspective, we assume that the machine
is controlled by the owner and that the attacker does not have physical access to it. This
means that only software-based anti-forensic techniques are feasible, although some of
these techniques may involve changing hardware settings through software. Most of the
hardware and software state involved in these anti-forensic techniques are cleared upon
reboot or rendered harmless in Forenscope’s clean environment. In investigation, the ad-
versary may elect to use a BIOS password, employ a secure boot loader, disable booting
from external devices or change BIOS settings to clear memory at boot time. These mit-
igation techniques may work, but if the investigator is sophisticated enough, he can try
techniques suggested by Halderman et al [35] to cool the memory chips and relocate them
to another machine that is configured to preserve the contents of DRAM at boot time. One
other avenue for working around a password-protected BIOS is to engage the boot loader
itself. We found that some boot loaders such as GRUB allow booting to external devices
even if the functionality is disabled in the BIOS. The only mitigation against this channel
is to use password protection on GRUB itself, which we believe is not frequently used.
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Alternately, some machines purposefully disable the USB ports in an attempt to prevent
the introduction of foreign software. This practice impedes the use of forensics software.
However, these policies are usually enforced at the OS level where Windows has been con-
figured to disallow external USB devices, even though the hardware and BIOS have been
configured to allow USB devices. In this case, Forenscope can circumvent the Windows-
based security policy because Windows is not running to enforce these access controls.
8.6 Limitations
The only safe harbor for malware to evade Forenscope is in conventional memory itself
because the act of rebooting pollutes the contents of the lower 640 KB of memory consid-
erably thus potentially erasing evidence. However, we contend that although this technique
is possible, it is highly unlikely for three reasons: first, for such malware to persist and al-
ter the control flow, the kernel must map in this memory area in the virtual address space.
This requires a change in the system page tables that is easily detectable by Forenscope
since most modern operating systems do not map the conventional memory space into
their virtual memory space. Secondly, such malware would have to inject a payload into
conventional memory and if the payload is corrupted by the reboot process, the system will
crash. Finally, such malware won’t survive computer hibernation because conventional
memory is not saved in the process. Even if Forenscope is unable to restore the system
due to extenuating circumstances, we still have an intact memory dump and disk image to
analyze.
In terms of fragility, Forenscope is versatile enough to adjust to the starting address of
global variables in the kernel as it looks them up using System.map in Linux and lever-
ages symbol lookup facilities. However, like existing examination tools such as Volatility,
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Forenscope is sensitive to the internal layout and offset of kernel data structures. Most
core data structures retain their layout in minor point release software revisions, however,
major releases can break compatibility. When this happens, internal circuit breakers (asser-
tions) within Forenscope halt execution if a major inconsistency is found. Handling major
changes in data structure layout is a hard problem faced by the debugging and reverse engi-
neering communities. Generally, major tools cannot adjust to these changes automatically,
but recent advances with adaptive reverse engineering tools/debuggers such as IDA Pro
offer promising results. Recent advancements [75, 76] can semi-automatically infer data
structure offsets by using instrumentation and disassembly of target code. This appears to
be a promising approach to determine necessary data structure offsets to enable the use of
tools such as Forenscope.
Recent advances in storage technology and privacy guards may necessitate a greater
research investment in volatile forensic tools. For instance, the adoption of SSD drives
threatens the use of traditional forensics tools that operate on magnetic media because these
drives use firmware that eagerly clears deleted data [77]. NAND-based drives must first
erase a disk block before the block can be written to. In order to optimize the process, drive
manufacturers have produced firmware that clears unused disk blocks in the background.
This process naturally erases residual forensic evidence. On the contrary, NAND drives
may also offer new hope for forensics as bad blocks are remapped to different areas and
existing privacy tools do not adequately handle these cases because they can fail to clean
up old replicas[78]. Phase Change Memory (PCM) is likely to encounter similar issues
[79, 80].
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Chapter 9
Related Work
The Forenscope framework uses many technologies to achieve a high-fidelity forensic
analysis environment through introspection, data structure analysis and integrity check-
ing. Many of the introspective techniques used by Forenscope were inspired by similar
functionality in debuggers and simulators. VMware’s VMsafe[81] protects guest virtual
machines from malware by using introspection. A virtual machine infrastructure running
VMsafe has a security monitor that periodically checks key structures in the guest operat-
ing system for alteration or corruption. Projects such as Xenaccess[6] take the idea further
and provide a way to list running processes, open files and other items of interest from
a running virtual machine in a Xen environment. Although Xenaccess and Forenscope
provide similar features, Xenaccess depends on the Xen virtual machine monitor, but the
investigator cannot rely on its presence or integrity. On some older critical infrastruc-
ture machines, legacy software requirements make it impractical to change the software
configuration. Forenscope does not have such requirements. Forenscope’s techniques to
recover operating system state from structures such as the process list have been explored
in the context of analyzing memory dumps using data structure organization derived from
reverse-engineered sources[82, 83]. Cozzie et al[84] used unsupervised learning to de-
tect data structures in memory while [85, 86, 87] reverse engineer data formats using au-
tomated extraction and mining techniques. Attestation shows that a machine is running
with an approved software and hardware configuration by performing an integrity check.
Forenscope builds upon work pioneered by the virtual machine introspection community
to allow forensic analysis of machines that are not prepared a-priori for such introspec-
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tion. It provides a transparent analysis platform that does not alter the host environment
and Forenscope supports services such as BitBlocker that allow an investigator to explore
a machine without worry of inducing taint.
The techniques used by Forenscope for recovering running systems are well grounded
in the systems community and have been studied previously in different scenarios. The
original Intel 286 design allowed entry into protected mode from real mode, but
omitted a mechanism to switch back. Microsoft and IBM used an elegant hack involving
memory remanence to force re-entry into real mode by causing a reboot to service BIOS
calls. This technique was described by Bill Gates as “turning the car off and on again at 60
mph” [88]. Some telecommunications operating systems such as Chorus [89] are designed
for quick recovery after a watchdog reset and simply recover existing data from the running
operating system rather than starting afresh. David [40] showed that it is possible to recover
from resets triggered by the watchdog timer on cell phones. BootJacker [36] showed that
it is possible for attackers to recover and compromise a running operating system by using
a carefully crafted forced reboot. Forenscope applies these techniques in the context of
forensic analysis and our work presents the merits and limitations of using such techniques
to build a forensic tool.
An alternative to state recovery techniques is to corrupt the state saved by the operating
system as part of the hibernation process. Sandman[90] takes this approach by intention-
ally patching the hibernation file of a sleeping machine. The authors reverse engineered the
compressed hibernation file format used by Microsoft Windows and patched the OS to cir-
cumvent security measures. While this approach may be less brittle than state-restoration
techniques because it uses a supported operating system vector, it does have several limita-
tions. First, when an operating system begin to hibernate, running applications are notified
of the hibernation request, which gives them an opportunity to clean up any secrets they
may have in memory. Second, networked applications tend to disconnect current sessions.
We have observed this behavior for SSH, VPN and remote desktop sessions. In contrast,
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Forenscope’s forced reboot skips over this notification process. Finally, the act of hiber-
nation creates entries in the system log and activates a system code path that wouldn’t be
invoked in the normal case, causing taint and other undesired side effects along the way.
Devices such as the Trusted Platform Module and Intel trusted execution technology
(TXT) provide boot time and run-time attestation respectively. Although TPM may be
available for some machines, the protection afforded by a TPM may not be adequate for
machines that are meant to run continuously for months. These machines perform an in-
tegrity check when they boot up, but their lengthy uptime results in a long time of check
to time of use (TOCTTOU) that extends the duration for breaches to remain undetected.
Hardware solutions such as Copilot[63] are available to check system integrity. In con-
trast, Forenscope performs an integrity assessment at the time of use; which allows the
investigator to collect evidence with better fidelity.
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Chapter 10
Concluding Remarks and Future Work
Forenscope explores live forensic techniques in the context of evidence preservation, non-
intrusiveness and fidelity that concern such approaches. Measured against existing tools,
our experiments show that Forenscope can achieve better compliance within the academic
guidelines prescribed by the community. Forenscope shows that volatile state can be pre-
served and that the techniques embodied in Forenscope are broadly applicable to modern
operating systems such as Windows and Linux. We encourage further development of tools
based on our high-fidelity analysis framework and believe that it can enable the advance-
ment of the state of the art.
Thorough evaluation of our techniques has shown that they are safe, practical and ef-
fective by minimally tainting the system, while causing negligible disruption to critical
systems. We believe that these techniques can be used in cases where traditional tools are
unable to meet the needs of modern investigations. Furthermore, we have shown that our
techniques provide the benefits of live forensics with the trustworthiness of dead box foren-
sics. To continue the development of this tool, we plan to work closely with partners to
better evaluate use of this tool in real-world scenarios such as incident response in a variety
of contexts.
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Appendix A
Cafegrind
Cafegrind1 is a memory analysis tool designed to help programmers and forensic analysts
better understand how memory is allocated and used within a program. As an extension
to Valgrind, it naturally supports all of the inherent memory checking abilities of the host
tool. The mission of Cafegrind differs from that of Valgrind in the sense that Cafegrind is
meant to understand the structure of data types and their associated access patterns. In this
dissertation, we use Cafegrind to measure the longevity of data structures in memory after
they have been relinquished by the free() or delete call. We also explore access patterns to
better quantify the velocity at which data structures change. These metrics provide a mea-
sure of fidelity for evidence. Structures that change infrequently are likely to have lower
blurriness and higher fidelity of capture. On the other hand, structures that are frequently
updated are likely to be subject to the effects of blurriness. We believe that the ability to
quantify these effects is essential to making an argument about the admissibility of fleeting
volatile evidence.
Unlike TaintBochs[31], we utilize a more semantically aware tracking approach that
respects actual data types. TaintBochs performs tracking at the byte level and is thus data
structure-agnostic. Similarly, Laika [84] attempts to infer data types using Bayesian anal-
ysis. Our approach uses intrinsic debugging information to track data types rather than
treating the machine as a blackbox. The limitations of our approach include: tracking only
user-level memory areas and the need for the target program to be compiled in debug mode.
1Cafegrind: C/C++ Analysis Forensic Engine for (Val)grind
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A.0.1 Cafegrind design
Valgrind
Cafegrind is designed as an extension to Valgrind [91], a suite of tools for debugging and
profiling. Common functionalities of Valgrind include memory leak detection, cache simu-
lation and program analysis to detect concurrency bugs. Valgrind executes target programs
by dynamically translating them into its internal VEX execution format. As a result, Val-
grind is able to perform fine-grained instrumentation at the lowest levels of the machine
architecture. Unlike similar emulation systems such as QEMU, Valgrind is also able to in-
terpret higher-level debugging symbol information to support various functionalities such
as memory leak detection. Cafegrind builds upon these intrinsic features to track the life-
cycle of data and provides additional insight into specific data structures by performing
automatic type inferencing.
The Lifecycle of Data
To better understand how evidence can be found in memory, we must first understand the
lifecycle of data. The lifecycle of data in a program is shown in Figure A.1. First, data is
allocated by a function such as malloc() or new, then it is initialized by a function such
as memset(), C++ constructor or memory pool constructor. Once the base object is ready,
its fields are populated with information and the structure is accessed and modified as the
program runs. Once the structure is no longer needed, it is freed and the memory returns
to a pool for reallocation. Throughout this process, evidence can be erased by modifica-
tion, initialization and reallocation. However, the process of relinquishing memory does
not always clear the latent contents of the data structure. In many cases, data is only par-
tially destroyed, as reuse of a memory area does not always completely overwrite old data.
This partial destruction process is the underlying principle behind volatile memory forensic
analysis and is useful in uncovering freed data. Cafegrind uses empirical methods to track
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Figure A.1: The lifecycle of data
how much data can be recovered from memory dumps that contain active and freed data.
Type Inferencing
Since C/C++ are not strongly typed languages, Cafegrind must infer the type of allocated
memory areas to build its object map. To illustrate how this works, consider the following
code snippet:
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[1] struct datastructure *mydata;
[2] mydata = (struct datastructure *)
malloc( sizeof( struct datastructure ) );
[3] mydata.fld1 = 100;
In the above example, on line 1, the program allocates space on the stack to store a
pointer to an object of type datastructure. Line 2 calls malloc() to allocate memory
for type datastructure, but malloc() returns a memory area with the type void* which
is then cast back to the proper type. This type casting is not present in the assembly code,
so we have to rely on an alternate method to infer the type. The key assignment here is
on line 2. When Cafegrind observes that the malloc memory area is assigned to a local
stack variable, Cafegrind propagates the type information from the stack variable to the
memory area. In assembly code, line 2 is implemented by using a store instruction where
the target of the store is the address of the stack variable mydata and the value written
to it is the address returned by malloc(). Cafegrind first checks if the type for the target
address is known and having determined that the type is struct datastructure,
we can propagate the type to the memory area described by the value in the instruction.
Cafegrind uses this incremental process to build and maintain an object map in memory.
Alternately, in C++, types can be inferred by monitoring object constructors. When
new is invoked, all constructors in an object’s inheritance hierarchy are called starting from
the most generic to the most specific. For instance, a square object may run its constructors
in the following order: shape→rectangle→square. In this case, the object type inference
would be made when the square constructor is called with a pointer to a square implicitly
passed with the this argument. Since C++ stores its constructors in a special ELF[92]
section called .ctors, we can adequately identify which functions serve as constructors for
type inferencing. Another safety check is to ensure that the name of the constructor is
consistent with the purported type of the object.
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Methodology
In order to track the data lifecycle of a program and build an object map by performing
type inferences, Cafegrind instruments the following events while a program is running:
1. Memory allocation
2. Data structure read/write accesses
3. Memory deallocation
In order to support type inferencing, Cafegrind intercepts all memory allocation and
deallocation requests. When an allocation is made, Cafegrind tracks the memory object
returned by malloc() and the stack backtrace at the time of the allocation. Recall that mal-
loc() does not return typed objects; objects are of the generic type void*. These allocations
are stored in an efficient ordered set data structure for fast lookup and retrieval. Cafegrind
only discovers the type of a memory object when the object is loaded into a typed pointer
object as described in Section A.0.1. This is enabled by intercepting store instructions to
memory locations and Cafegrind can thus track the assembly level assignment of a pointer
to the memory object to a stack location. If the pointer points to a tracked memory location,
Cafegrind performs a lookup on the debug information associated with the executable to
describe the type of the stack variable. This process queries the debug information present
in loaded libraries and binaries in the DWARF3 [93] format and helps identify the type of
the stack object. Once the type of the stack object has been identified, it is then propagated
to the dynamically allocated memory object and stored in the same ordered set.
In addition to performing type inferencing, Cafegrind also tracks accesses and modifi-
cations to the data structure. This allows analysis of the access patterns to a particular type.
These accesses are tracked by instrumenting all memory loads and stores. In the previous
code snippet, line 3 illustrates how Cafegrind tracks data accesses. When a memory ad-
dress is accessed, Cafegrind checks its internal allocation database to see whether or not
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the access belongs to a tracked allocation. If so, Cafegrind identifies which allocation the
access belongs to and resolves the member being accessed. These accesses are tracked and
aggregated statistically to reveal how the underlying data types are being used. Further,
we also track which function call led to the data access and aggregate this information to
find which data types a particular function accesses. Cafegrind once again uses efficient
ordered sets to perform the lookup and updates quickly.
Cafegrind also maintains a set for allocations that have been freed by the application.
This set is used to track when objects are overwritten in memory and helps determine the
time at which data is destroyed. In addition to tracking the properties of data structures, we
also collect their contents. This is useful for offline analysis using utilities like strings
and the contents are clustered by their type in separate files to enable easier processing.
By performing such monitoring, Cafegrind is able to better understand how data is
created, accessed and destroyed. This can provide an empirical analysis on which data
structures can be expected to persist and for how long. For instance, a forensic analyst may
find some interesting information in an HTML cache object, but this type of object may
be transient and the data stored in it can change throughout a browsing session as the user
visits certain websites. Cafegrind can provide an analysis of the longevity of such data.
A.0.2 Observations
Experimental Setup
Our technique described in Section A.0.1 relies on explicitly monitoring canonical variable
accesses and assignments. Common compiler optimizations can store pointer values in
registers instead of allocating space on the stack. This process can disturb Cafegrind’s type
inferencing algorithm, so Cafegrind only works on binaries and shared libraries that are
compiled with debugging enabled and optimization disabled. From a forensic standpoint,
an investigator is unlikely to encounter a machine with such a configuration. However, the
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purpose of this paper is to study the ideal behavior of data structures, and applying these
alterations does not operationally affect the behavior of the applications we study except
for imposing additional runtime overhead when the program is being instrumented.
We used two test machines in our Cafegrind experiments. Our first test machine has
two quad core Intel Xeon E5410 CPUs running at 2.33 Ghz with 4 GB of RAM. Our sec-
ond test machine has a single Intel Core i7 920 CPU running at 2.67 GHz with 6 GB of
RAM. Both machines are running Gentoo Linux 1.12.14 on the 2.6.34-r12 kernel. All the
applications and libraries are compiled with debugging enabled and optimization disabled.
This configuration affords Cafegrind visibility into the inner workings of system applica-
tions and libraries. As a result, we can trace the entire execution chain of entire subsystems
such as the KDE desktop environment if desired.
Basic Concepts
For each object, we track the following attributes:
1. Type - The type of an object
2. Size - The size of an object
3. Age - The length of time an allocation lasts before it is deallocated
4. FreedAge - The length of time a deallocated structure lasts before it is clobbered by a
subsequent allocation
5. Reads - Number of reads performed
6. Writes - Number of writes performed
7. Size - Size of the allocation
Our evaluation methodology cross-analyzes these attributes to find correlations which
reveal patterns and relationships in the way that these structures are allocated, accessed and
freed.
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Table A.1: Coverage
Application Store
Cover-
age
Load
Cover-
age
Overall
Cover-
age
Firefox 70.48 % 88.11 % 83.51 %
KWrite 85.8 % 94.27 % 92.66 %
Links 99.09 % 99.99 % 99.6 %
Tor 85.95 % 96.43 % 95.02%
We measured forensically interesting data structures in several ways. First, we apply
well-known string identification algorithms to find ASCII strings in memory. This helps
us identify web pages and XML documents as well as HTTP requests that are latent in
memory. Secondly, we perform basic outlier analysis on the dataset to highlight objects that
are large, frequently accessed, or have great longevity. Other attributes are also considered
in this process. Cafegrind then produces a list of candidate types that the forensic analyst
can inspect more closely to find evidence of interest.
The precise list of identifiers is:
1. ASCII content - Structures with a large (configurable) percentage of ASCII characters
2. Entropy - Incompressible structures such as images, audio and encryption keys
3. Pointer content - Important structures are likely to be linked to other important structures
in the object graph
In this paper, we have taken the candidate list and applied our expertise to identify and
measure the characteristics of interesting types of evidence.
Correctness
The type inferencing coverage is measured by counting the number of load/store operations
on dynamically allocated regions of memory for which Cafegrind has inferred the type. In
terms of type inferencing coverage, Cafegrind performs remarkably well. As shown in
Table A.1, we have seen upwards of 90% type inferencing coverage for many real world
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applications. This behavior should be expected since the type information comes from de-
bug information ingrained in the program itself. The coverage was also improved as the
system used for evaluation contained shared libraries built with debug information. Addi-
tionally since we tracked load/store instructions from the program and its linked libraries,
our type inferencing technique was able to get a clear insight into the creation and usage of
data types. There are several factors that can adversely affect the performance of the type
inferencing system:
1. Generic arrays of char* and similar types that are cast into specific types before access
2. Variable length structures where the last element is a void* or char*
3. Unions used in structures where the type is ambiguous
4. Nested types with unions. Cafegrind currently doesn’t handle nested type agreement.
5. The use of custom allocators which return void*. Cafegrind isn’t able to follow multiple
levels of type propagation currently
Nonetheless, Cafegrind still performs very well in real-world scenarios. Certainly, there
are cases where programs use certain practices that may be challenging for type inferencing
systems to handle. As we’ve seen with Firefox and QT, there are large codebases that use
pointer wrappers, templating and other constructs which can obscure the true type of an
object. This remains a challenge for even the best type inferencing systems. In the absence
of compiler assistance, there aren’t many options to handle these cases. For example,
KOP [59] relies on additional compiler information to extract the type assignments. We
do acknowledge that Cafegrind was not extensively tested against a ground truth, primarily
because of the difficulty of obtaining a valid ground truth. However, from experience and
cross validation, we believe that we’ve obtained fairly useful results.
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Table A.2: Performance
Application Time
Firefox native 6 s
Firefox Cafegrind 3:30 m
Firefox Lackey 2:57 m
Firefox Memcheck 1:52 m
Konqueror 2 s
Konqueror Lackey 3:12 s
Konqueror Cafegrind 3:26 s
A.0.3 Code Metrics
Cafegrind is over 2,100 lines of code and it builds upon the Valgrind framework, which has
over 87,000 lines of code. Adding tracing and instrumentation functionality in Cafegrind
is relatively straightforward by using standard Valgrind functions.
A.0.4 Performance
We compared the performance of Cafegrind against the performance of the Valgrind tool
itself in Table A.2. Valgrind in its purest form imposes a modest performance penalty
because it does binary translation and intercepts function calls. When Valgrind’s Lackey
full binary instrumentation mode is activated, the performance quickly degrades as each
instruction is individually executed with memory tracing support enabled. Since Cafegrind
uses facilities that are similar to what Lackey does, its performance is similar to that of
Lackey. The additional functionalities of type inferencing and object tracking consume
around 29% and 7% of execution time respectively for Tor and Konqueror. For Firefox,
inferencing and tracking consume 14% and 11% respectively.
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